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The Department of Economics of Western Michigan University was 
fortunate to attract six eminent agricultural economists to its 1986-87 
lecture-seminar series to address various dimensions of the problem of 
world food and agriculture. This book contains six essays based on the 
public lectures delivered by the guest scholars during the 1986-87 
academic year.
This introductory chapter will address and synthesize some of the 
main issues and problems of world food and agriculture and leave the 
reader to pursue the detailed discussion and analysis of the issues by 
the individual authors. The essays are presented in the order of the 
scholar's appearance in the lecture-seminar series.
Some of the main issues and problems addressed in the essays are: 
(1) the role of technical change in agricultural development; (2) the value 
of learning from historical and comparative experience in tackling rural 
and agricultural development problems; (3) the role of foreign assistance 
in agricultural and rural development; and (4) the current problem of 
hunger in Africa.
The Role of Technical Change in Agricultural Development
The issue of technical change in agricultural development is most ex 
tensively explored in Vernon Ruttan's essay. In his model of "induced 
technical change," Ruttan stresses the idea that technical change is in 
digenous, that is, made possible by farmers' responses to differences 
in availability and relative prices of resources.
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He argues that differences in the economic environment and resource 
endowment are critical in influencing the direction of technical change. 
He supports his argument by presenting empirical evidence based on 
historical data on the experience of Japan and the United States in 
agricultural development. He points out that Japan adopted a biological 
and chemical agricultural technology that is land-substituting and labor- 
augmenting primarily as a response to the relative scarcity of arable 
land it faced during its historic agricultural development. On the other 
hand, the United States adopted a mechanical agricultural technology 
that is labor-substituting and land-using because it had relatively abun 
dant arable land and scarce labour during its historic period of agricultural 
development. Ruttan shows, using comparative data of the two coun 
tries, that the difference in long-term trends in relative factor prices 
"induced" the different paths of technological change adopted by each 
country.
Bruce Johnston extends the issue of technical change beyond the critical 
role of relative factor prices and resource endowments by pointing out 
that the promotion of technical change in agriculture is not automatic 
and self-generating. He argues that the promotion of technical change 
requires active participation by both private and public institutions. The 
private aspect of technical change is determined by what he calls "farm- 
level factors" that require investments in land improvement, equipment, 
fertilizer, improved crop and livestock varieties, working capital, and 
skills of farmers. Individual farmers are in the best position to under 
take the decision about the proper acquisition and utilization of these 
factors, while government can play a supportive role. On the other hand, 
inappropriate government policies, such as unfavourable price policy 
to farmers, can impede the development of these farm-level factors.
Successful adoption of farm-level technologies also requires what 
Johnston calls "socially determined facts" such as agricultural research, 
an extension system, and infrastructure, as well as appropriate 
macroeconomic policy environment. The latter factors, which are com 
plementary to the farm-level factors, are beyond the control of individual 
farmers. They can best be provided by government.
The resource endowment situation of most developing countries is 
characterized by abundant rural labor that calls for effective utilization
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in the agricultural sector which in turn requires the adoption of labour- 
intensive chemical and biological technology as the most appropriate 
form of technical change. Chemical and biological technology that is 
yield-increasing is characterized by complementarity between inputs such 
as fertilizer and water. This implies that in a tropical and semi-arid en 
vironment, successful adoption of such technology requires adequate 
water availability that can only be provided by irrigation in the absence 
of reliable rainfall and the presence of recurrent drought.
Moreover, environmentally-specific chemical and biological 
technologies are not on the shelf for some tropical regions of the world 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore important to take up the 
challenge as stated by Ruttan: "Over the next few decades to develop 
agricultural research capacity in each agro-climate region of the world 
in order to take advantage of development in biological/chemical 
technology."
The critical obstacle to generation and adoption of agricultural 
technology in the future may not be the lack of scientific and technical 
change, but may arise from domestic economic policy and political bar 
riers to technical progress in the agriculture of many developing 
countries.
The Value of Learning from Historical and Comparative Experience 
in Tackling Rural and Agricultural Development Problems
Lessons from historical experience of other countries are quite valuable 
in tackling problems of rural and agricultural development, provided 
they are correctly understood and applied. The significance of past ex 
perience in understanding the poverty problem in general is stated by 
T.W. Schultz in his inaugural lecture for winning the Nobel prize in 
development economics as follows: "Understanding the experience of 
poor people over the ages can contribute much to understanding the 
problems and possibilities of low-income countries today. That kind 
of understanding is far more important than the most detailed and ex 
act knowledge about the surface of the earth, or of ecology, or of tomor 
row's technology." 1
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The historical experience of Japan and the United States in choosing 
the technological path appropriate to their relative resource endowment 
has already been pointed out. Further, as argued in Johnston's essay, 
the Japanese experience is perhaps the most relevant for today's develop 
ing countries, since it involved increasing small farm productivity by 
adopting labor-intensive biological/chemical technology in the form of 
fertilizer and improved crop varieties as well as the concurrent develop 
ment of agriculture and industry which allowed positive interaction be 
tween the two sectors and gradual absorption of labour by industry and 
other sectors of the economy. If agricultural productivity had not risen 
to provide adequate food supplies, the terms of trade would have turn 
ed against the industrial sector retarding the growth of the Japanese 
economy. However, this was prevented by Japan's successful adop 
tion of biological and chemical technology which increased food pro 
duction as well as provided necessary employment during the historic 
transformation of the economy.
Comparative lesssons from a more recent experience of other develop 
ing countries, such as India and China, also have some useful implica 
tions for regions of the currently deficient agriculture and food pro 
duction, such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The Indian case is presented by 
Uma Lele who reminds us that, after the earlier policies that under 
valued agriculture and contributed to the food crisis of the 1960s, India 
later carried out an economic reform which included the development 
of a strong agricultural research system and an effective fertilizer 
distribution network, raised farm commodity prices, and provided in 
centives to farmers to use fertilizer and new crop varieties. Lele points 
out further tht the food situation of India before and during the reform 
20 years ago was similar to the current food and agricultural situation 
in Ethiopia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
While the institutional context is different, China's simultaneous em 
phasis on rural and agricultural development and rural industrializa 
tion featured by small labor-intensive rural industries also provides a 
valuable lesson. Furthermore, China's experience with the organiza 
tion of agriculture demonstrates a valuable lesson about the limitation 
of collectivized agriculture as a viable economic unit of agricultural 
development. After a long experience with collective farming, China
Introduction 5
found that even small collective farms posed serious incentive and 
managerial problems and introduced, since 1981, reforms that have 
essentially returned Chinese agriculture to a system of individual 
household fanning units.
Valuable lessons from comparative experience can be drawn not on 
ly from similarities but from dissimilarities, as stated by Lele. She points 
out that, while Africa and India are of about the same geographical size, 
Africa is much more diverse, constituting some 50 different nations, 
about one thousand ethnic groups, and several thousand languages. In 
dia, on the other hand, is one country with less diversity than Africa. 
More significantly, Lele states that India's food production problem 
was simplified by the fact that it was primarily a problem of increasing 
the production of wheat and rice, for which technology was being 
developed by the international research centres in cooperation with In 
dian agricultural scientists. The current food production problem in 
Africa, on the other hand, is more complex than the Indian case, since 
it means the development and adoption of technologies for a more com 
plex and diverse food grain system, such as sorghum, millet, maize, 
cassava, root crops, for most of which environmentally-specific and 
locally tested technologies have not been developed.
The Role of Foreign Assistance 
in Agricultural and Rural Development
Foreign assistance can play an important role in agricultural and rural 
development provided that it is properly focused and utilized in 
alleviating rural poverty. Considerable experience with foreign assistance 
has been gained over the past few decades to help distinguish between 
which types of assistance have been successful and unsuccessful. Foreign 
assistance has the greatest potential to succeed when it is focused on 
agricultural and rural development. As John Mellor notes, this is because 
of the employment- and income-generating implication of agriculture 
that make increased food production and increased employment "two 
sides of the same coin." Increased food production can initiate multi-
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pie forces of growth, employment and income generation in the whole 
economy of a typical developing country characterized by the majority 
of its population still on the rural sector, as implied in Mellor's essay.
Peter Timmer and John Mellor are in general agreement on the no 
tion that improving agricultural and food production in developing coun 
tries has a positive sum outcome of reducing poverty in the Third World 
and increasing U.S. farm exports. Timmer's analysis, which emphasizes 
a macroeconomic framework, is, however, cautiously optimistic about 
the implication of increased food production in the Third World for 
U.S. agricultural exports. He shows, through a complex web of general 
equilibrium relationships, the structural adjustment to global competitive 
pressures required by U.S. agriculture in the future.
Another feature of successful foreign assistance is that it is long term 
and sustained, as noted by Eicher and Lele. Currently, there are good 
reasons to be concerned with the state of foreign assistance in Africa, 
which appears to be short term, unstable, and uncoordinated. Numerous 
donors guided with diverse objectives and criteria are engaged in the 
"business of foreign assistance" in Africa. The value of some of this 
assistance in reducing poverty and hunger is quite questionable. Eicher 
raises a challenging question to donors when he asks: "Why did the 
U.S. government take the long view in India in the 1960s when it helped 
develop 23 new state agricultural universities and funded their develop 
ment for 15 years? Why is the United States taking the short-run view 
in Africa in the 1980s?"
As a form of development assistance, food aid, which is currently 
popular, is quite inadequate. It can only be justified as a tool of famine 
relief, as stated by Johnston. Food assistance can even be harmful 
because it may divert the attention of governments from the critical prob 
lem of long-run agricultural development and poverty alleviation 
required for ending hunger. Moreover, it cannot be sustained in the 
long run and has the potential of being used as a political tool by donors 
and recipients.
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The Current Problem of Hunger in Africa
The contemporary problem of hunger in Africa is most directly ad 
dressed in Carl Richer's essay, where he outlines six challenges that 
must be faced by scientists, policy makers and politicians in order to 
end hunger in Africa. I find three of these challenges especially crucial. 
One challenge posed by Richer to African politicians and governments 
is to look back and learn from their own experience of recent history 
and correct the mistaken economic policies that undervalued agriculture 
and food production, and to face up to the fundamental fact that 
agricultural development is an evolutionary and complex process that 
does not lend itself to rhetoric, ideology, or crash food production cam 
paigns. Current and future generations of African policy makers must 
learn from the painful experience of some African nations that wasted 
a generation on revolutionary rhetoric and ideological entanglement in 
global power politics, and on hasty, ill-planned rural and agricultural 
experimentation that has contributed to increasing mass poverty and 
hunger.
Another challenge is the need to make a critical investment in human 
capital development and carry out necessary educational reforms away 
from the colonial elitist model that sets wrong curriculum priorities and 
undermines technical and agricultural education. For instance, the 
University of Botswana, 22 years after independence, does not have 
a faculty of engineering or technology, and its faculty of agriculture 
is just being launched during the current academic year.
The final challenge posed by Eicher is the need for policy makers, 
both donors and recipients, to focus in what he calls ' 'the prime movers'' 
of agricultural development, such as new technology generation and 
adoption, human capital and managerial skill development, biological 
and physical capital development, institutional development and im 
plementation, as well as development of an economic policy environ 
ment favorable to agriculture and food production. It is important, as 
pointed out by Eicher, for donors and African governments to make 
long-term and sustained investments simultaneously on all of these 
"prime movers" due to their complementary and lengthy gestation
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period. Emphasis on one factor, such as the one currently prescribed 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for mak 
ing domestic price policy reform in exchange for additional loans and 
grants can be ineffective. In other words, policy initiatives such as 
domestic currency devaluation, abolishing price controls, eliminating 
government grain boards and fertilizer subsidies, when carried out is 
isolation without any clear guidelines and assistance to manage the 
political and economic consequences, will be unlikely to succeed, as 
Richer's essay implies.
In sum, African governments and policymakers must take the primary 
responsibility and effort in restructuring their domestic policy environ 
ment. Donors can assist in complementing this effort by making a 
necessary long term and sustained investment in agricultural and rural 
development.
NOTE
1. See the Nobel Lecture by T. W. Schultz ' 'The Economics of Being Poor,'' Journal of Political 




Vernon W. Ruttan 
University of Minnesota
We are, in the closing years of the twentieth century, completing one 
of the most remarkable transitions in the history of agriculture. Prior 
to this century, almost all increase in food production was obtained by 
bringing new land into production. There were only a few exceptions 
to this generalization in limited areas of East Asia, in the Middle East, 
and in Western Europe. By the end of this century, almost all of the 
increase in world food production must come from higher yields from 
increased output per hectare. In most of the world, the transition from 
a resource-based to a science-based system of agriculture is occurring 
within a single century. In a few countries this transition began in the 
nineteenth century. In most of the presently developed countries it did 
not begin until the first half of this century. Most of the countries of 
the developing world have been caught up in the transition only since 
mid-century.
Models of Technical Change in Agriculture
The traditional literature on agricultural development can be classified 
under five general headings. These are (1) the resource exploitation, 
(2) the conservation, (3) the location, (4) the diffusion, and (5) the high- 
payoff input models.
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The Resource Exploitation Model
Throughout most of history, expansion of the area cultivated or grazed 
has represented the dominant source of increase in agricultural produc 
tion. The most dramatic example in western history was the opening 
up of the new continents North and South America and Australia to 
European settlement during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With 
the advent of cheap transport during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, the countries of the new continents became increasingly im 
portant sources of food and agricultural raw materials for the 
metropolitan countries of Western Europe.
Similar processes had occurred earlier, though at a less dramatic pace, 
in the peasant and village economies of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The 
agrarian colonization of the Indus and Ganges river valleys occurred 
in the third millennium B.C. The first millennium A.D. saw the 
agricultural colonization of Europe north of the Alps, the Chinese set 
tlement of the lands south of the Yangtze, and the Bantu occupation 
of Africa south of the tropical forest belts. Intensification of land use 
in existing villages was followed by pioneer settlement, the establish 
ment of new villages, and the opening up of forest or jungle land to 
cultivation. In Western Europe there was a series of successive changes 
from neolithic forest fallow to systems of shifting cultivation of bush 
and grassland followed first by short fallow systems, and later by an 
nual cropping.
Where soil conditions were favorable, as in the great river basins and 
plains, the new villages gradually intensified their system of cultiva 
tion. Where soil resources were poor, as in many of the hill and upland 
regions, new areas were opened up to shifting cultivation or nomadic 
grazing. Under conditions of rapid population growth, the limits to the 
resource exploitation model were often quickly realized. Crop yields 
were typically low measured in terms of output per unit of seed rather 
than per unit of crop area. Output per hectare and per man-hour tended 
to decline except in the delta areas of Egypt and South Asia and in 
the wet rice areas of East Asia. In many areas the result was increasing 
burden on the peasantry.
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Agriculture carried on within the framework of the resource exploita 
tion model was, in most parts of the world, capable of supporting only 
very limited urban concentrations trading centers and seats of govern 
ment. Most food was consumed in the village in which it was produc 
ed. Much of the surplus that did become available was extracted from 
the village by the landlords in the form of rents, and by the church in 
the form of tithes. The limited surplus that could be accumulated ex 
erted a decisive impact on political organizations. Charlemagne's cam 
paigns against the Germans to extend his Prankish kingdom could not 
be waged until early summer. The great heavy horses that carried his 
armed knights had to be out on grass, after a winter on poor feed, long 
enough to get in condition.
There are relatively few remaining areas of the world where develop 
ment along the lines of the resource exploitation model will represent 
an efficient source of growth during the last two decades of the twen 
tieth century. The 1960s saw the "closing of the frontier" in most areas 
of Southeast Asia. In Latin American and Africa, the opening up of 
new lands awaits development of technologies for the control of pests 
and diseases (such as the tsetse fly in Africa) or for the release and 
maintenance of productivity of problem soils. The decline in food pro 
duction that has been experienced in many African countries over the 
last several decades is an insistent reminder that agricultural growth 
along the lines described by the resource exploitation model is no longer 
a reliable source of growth in food production.
The Conservation Model
The conservation model of agricultural development evolved from 
the advances in crop and livestock husbandry associated with the English 
agricultural revolution and the notions of soil exhaustion suggested by 
the early German chemists and soil scientists. It was reinforced by the 
application to land of the concept, developed in the English classical 
school of economics, of diminishing returns to labor and capital.
Until well into the twentieth century, the conservation model of 
agricultural development was the only approach to intensification of
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agricultural production available to most of the world's farmers. Its ap 
plication is effectively illustrated by the development of the wet rice 
culture systems that emerged in East and Southeast Asia and by the labor- 
and land-intensive systems of integrated crop-livestock husbandry which 
increasingly characterized European agriculture during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.
During the English agricultural revolution, more intensive crop rota 
tion systems replaced the open-three-field system in which arable land 
was allocated between permanent cropland and permanent pasture. This 
involved the introduction and more intensive use of new forage and green 
manure crops and an increase in the availability and use of animal 
manures. This "new husbandry" permitted the intensification of crop- 
livestock production through the recycling of plant nutrients, in the form 
of animal manures, to maintain soil fertility. The inputs used in this 
conservation system of farming the plant nutrients, animal power, land 
improvements, physical capital, and agricultural labor force were large 
ly produced or supplied by the agricultural sector itself.
Agricultural development, within the framework of the conservation 
model, clearly was capable in many parts of the world of sustaining 
rates of growth in agricultural production in the range of 1.0 percent 
per year over relatively long periods of time. The most serious recent 
effort to develop agriculture within this framework was made by the 
People's Republic of China in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It became 
readily apparent, however, that the feasible growth rates, even with 
a rigorous recycling effort, were not compatible with modern rates of 
growth in the demand for agricultural output which typically fall in- 
the 3-5 percent range in the less developed countries (LDCs). The con 
servation model remains an important source of productivity growth 
in most poor countries and an inspiration to agrarian fundamentalists 
and the organic farming movement in the developed countries.
The Location Model
Initially, the location model was formulated in Germany by J.H. von 
Thiinen to explain geographic variations in the intensity of farming 
systems and the productivity of labor in an industralizing society. In
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the United States, it was extended to explain the more effective perfor 
mance of the input and product markets in regions of rapid urban- 
industrial development than in regions of slower urban-industrial 
development. In the 1950s, interest in the location model reflected con 
cern with the failure of agricultural resource development and price 
policies, adopted in the 1930s, to remove the persistent regional 
disparities in agricultural productivity and rural incomes in the United 
States.
The rationale for this model was developed in terms of more effec 
tive input and product markets in areas of rapid urban-industrial develop 
ment. Industrial development stimulated agricultural development by 
expanding the demand for farm products, supplying the industrial in 
puts needed to improve agricultural productivity, and drawing away 
surplus labor from agriculture. The empirical tests of the location model 
have confirmed repeatedly that a strong nonfarm labor market is a prere 
quisite for labor productivity in agriculture and improved incomes for 
rural people.
The policy implications of the location model appear to be most rele 
vant for less developed regions of highly industrialized countries or lag 
ging regions of the more rapidly growing LDCs. Agricultural develop 
ment policies based on this model appear to be particularly inappropriate 
in those countries where the "pathological" growth of urban centers 
is a result of population pressures in rural areas running ahead of employ 
ment growth in urban areas.
The Diffusion Model
The diffusion of better husbandry practices was a major source of 
productivity growth even in premodem societies. The diffusion of crops 
and animals from the new world to the old potatoes, maize, cassava, 
rubber and from the old world to the new sugar, wheat, and domestic 
livestock was an important by-product of the voyages of discovery 
and trade from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
Diffusion of crops and animals had historically proceeded as a by 
product of trade, discovery and migration. The diffusion of maize to 
the Old World is an example. Within a decade after Columbus had first
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displayed Indian Cora (maize) at the Spanish court, it was being grown 
in the Po Valley in Northern Italy. In that relatively short time it had 
diffused from Spain and across North Africa to Turkey and was brought 
to the Po Valley by Venetian traders.
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, all major agricultural na 
tions were actively engaged in organized crop exploration and introduc 
tion. The famous trip of Captain Bligh to the South Pacific, described 
in the book and the film, Mutiny on the Bounty, was undertaken as a 
crop exploration mission. His assignment was to bring back breadfruit 
seedlings and wild sugarcane cultivars.
Botanical gardens were established by the great colonial powers 
primarily to serve as crop introduction stations. The diffusion of rub 
ber from Brazil to Southeast Asia illustrates their role. When the pro 
cess of vulcanization was invented making it possible to produce such 
desirable products as rubber boots, raincoats and tyres the price of 
natural rubber, produced from wild trees in the Amazon basin of Brazil, 
skyrocketed. Brazil made it illegal to export either rubber seeds or rubber 
plants. The British sent a botanical expedition to Brazil with the osten 
sible purpose of collecting plants that had medicinal value, but they also 
brought back rubber seeds. The seeds were first sprouted at the Royal 
Botanical Garden at Kew. The seedlings were then transferred to the 
botanical gardens at Kandy (Ceylon) and in Singapore. The Kandy seed 
lings died but the Singapore seedlings lived and became the foundation 
stock of the rubber industry in Southeast Asia.
In the early post-World War n period, the diffusion model provided 
the intellectual foundation for technical assistance to developing coun 
tries. President Truman talked about American "know-how show- 
how." The naive diffusion approach drew on the empirical observa 
tion of substantial differences in land and labor productivity among 
farmers and regions. The route to agricultural development in this view 
was through more effective dissemination of technical knowledge and 
the narrowing of productivity differences.
The diffusion model has provided the major intellectual foundation 
of much of the research and extension effort in farm management and 
production economics since the emergence, in the latter years of the
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nineteenth century, of agricultural economics and rural sociology as 
separate subdisciplines linking the agricultural and the social sciences. 
Developments leading to the establishment of active programs of farm 
management research and extension occurred at a time when experi 
ment station research was making only a modest contribution to 
agricultural productivity growth. A further contribution to the effec 
tive diffusion of known technology was provided by rural sociologists' 
research on the diffusion process. Models were developed emphasiz 
ing the relationship between diffusion rates and the personality 
characteristics and educational accomplishments of farm operators.
Insights into the dynamics of the diffusion process, when coupled with 
the observation of wide agricultural productivity gaps among developed 
and less developed countries and a presumption of inefficient resource 
allocation among "irrational, tradition-bound" peasants, produced an 
extension or diffusion bias in the choice of agricultural development 
strategy in many LDCs during the 1950s. During the 1960s, the limita 
tions of the diffusion on technology transfer model as a foundation for 
the design of agricultural development policies became increasingly ap 
parent as technical assistance and rural development programs based 
explicitly or implicitly on this model failed to generate either rapid 
modernization of traditional farms and communities or rapid growth 
in agricultural output. There were very few opportunities to generate 
large productivity gains through the transfer of technology from one 
agroclimatic zone to another, or even among regions in the same 
agroclimatic zone. The pipeline was empty!
The High-Payoff Input Model
The inadequacy of policies based on the conservation, urban-industrial 
impact, and diffusion models led, in the 1960s, to a new perspective: 
The key to transforming a traditional agricultural sector into a produc 
tive source of economic growth is investment designed to make modern, 
high-payoff inputs available to farmers in poor countries. Peasants in 
traditional agricultural systems were viewed as rational, efficient resource 
allocators.
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In Transforming Traditional Agriculture, T.W. Schultz insisted that 
peasants in traditional societies remained poor because there were only 
limited technical and economic opportunities to which they could re 
spond. The new, high-payoff inputs were classified according to three 
categories: (1) the capacity of public and private sector research institu 
tions to produce new technical knowledge; (2) the capacity of the in 
dustrial sector to develop, produce, and market new technical inputs; 
and (3) the capacity of farmers to acquire new knowledge and use new 
inputs effectively.
The enthusiasm with which the high-payoff input model has been ac 
cepted and translated into economic doctrine has been due in part to 
the proliferation of studies reporting high rates of return to public in 
vestment in agricultural research (table 1). It was also due to the suc 
cess of efforts to develop new, high-productivity grain varieties suitable 
for the tropics. New, high-yield wheat varieties were developed in Mex 
ico beginning in the 1950s, and new, high-yield rice varieties were 
developed in the Philippines in the 1960s. These varieties were highly 
responsive to industrial inputs such as fertilizer and other chemicals 
and to more effective soil and water management. The high returns 
associated with the adoption of the new varieties and the associated 
technical inputs and management practices have led to rapid growth 
in investment in agricultural research and to the development and adop 
tion of the new and more productive crop varieties among farmers in 
a number of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
But the acceptance of the high-pay off input model has been incomplete. 
Many countries have not yet freed their private sector to produce and 
market the new technical inputs that enhance productivity. Those are 
functions which the public sector typically performs poorly. The con 
straints placed on market development continue to deprive farmers and 
consumers of the gains from new technology that are becoming available.
There has been even greater reluctance, in a number of developing 
countries, to accept the implication of the high-payoff input model for 
the schooling of farm people. The intellectuals and planners in many 
developing countries find it difficult to understand the importance, for 
agricultural development, of a literate and a numerate peasantry. When 
advances in agricultural technology occurred slowly, the apprenticeship
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mode of learning, without formal schooling, from family and village 
elders was adequate. But when a continuous stream of new biological 
and mechanical technology becomes available the returns to the acquisi 
tion of new skills in production and marketing are driven up. It becomes 
important not only to accept but also to be able to adapt or reject the 
new "packages" of practices and inputs being recommended by research 
and extension services. Agricultural extension services themselves must 
be able to advance beyond simply recommending a package of prac 
tices or delivering technological and managerial messages to farmers. 
They must advance from teaching practices to teaching principles!
It seems quite clear that Pakistan has not yet made the investment 
in the schooling of rural people to enable it to take full advantage of 
the potentially high-payoff technology that is becoming available. In 
spite of one of the world's great pieces of agricultural real estate 35 
million acres of irrigated land in the Indus basin yields remain low 
by Asian standards. It is hard to avoid a conclusion that underinvest 
ment in human capital has dampened the rate of return to investment 
in land and water development and to agricultural research and extension.
Induced Technical Change in Agriculture
The high-payoff input model remains incomplete as a theory of 
agricultural development. Typically, education and research are public 
goods not traded through the marketplace. The mechanism by which 
resources are allocated among education, research, and other public 
and private sector economic activities was not fully incorporated into 
the model. It does not explain how economic conditions induce the 
development and adoption of an efficient set of technologies for a par 
ticular society. Nor does it attempt to specify the processes by which 
input and product price relationships induce investment in research in 
a direction consistent with a nation's particular resource endowments.
These limitations in the high-payoff input model led Yujiro Hay ami 
and I to develop a model of agricultural development in which technical 
change is treated as an exogenous factor. This induced innovation
Table 1 
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SOURCE: Robert E. Evenson, Paul E. Waggoner, and Vernon W. Ruttan, "Economic Benefits from Research- An Example from Agriculture," Science,
205 (September 14, 1979), pp. 1101-7. Copyright 1979 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
a. Returns to maize research only.
b. Returns to maize research plus cultivation "package."
c. Lower estimate for 13-, and higher for 16-year time lag between beginning and end of output impact.
d. Lagged marginal product of 1969 research on output discounted for an estimated mean lag of 5 years for cash grains, 6 years for poultry and dairy,
and 7 years for livestock.
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perspective was stimulated by historical evidence that different coun 
tries had followed alternative paths of technical change in the process 
of agricultural development. In the induced innovation model, changes 
or differences in the economic environment influence the direction of 
technical change.
In discussing the induced innovation Model, I will find it useful, at 
the risk of some oversimplification, to use the term mechanical 
technology to refer to those technologies which substitute for labor and 
the term biological technology to refer to those technologies which 
generate increases in output per hectare.
Mechanical and Biological Processes 
in Agricultural Production
The mechanization of agricultural production cannot be treated as 
simply an adaptation of industrial methods of production to agriculture. 
The spatial nature of agricultural production results in significant dif 
ferences between agriculture and industry in patterns of machine use. 
It imposes severe limits on the efficiency of large scale production in 
agriculture.
The spatial dimension of crop production requires that the machines 
suitable for agricultural production must be mobile they must move 
across or through materials that are immobile in contrast to moving 
material through stationary machines as in most industrial processes. 
Furthermore, the seasonal or spatial characteristics of agricultural pro 
duction require a series of specialized machines for land preparation, 
planting, weed control and harvesting specifically designed for sequen 
tial operations, each of which is carried out for only a few days or weeks 
in each season. This means that it is no more feasible for workers to 
specialize in one operation in mechanized agriculture than in 
premechanized agriculture. It also means that in a "fully mechanized" 
agricultural system, the capital-labor ratio tends to be much higher than 
in the industrial sector in the same country.
In agriculture, biological and chemical processes are more fundamental 
than mechanization or machine processes. This generalization was
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equally true during the last century as it will be during the era of the 
"new biotechnology." Advances in biological and chemical technology 
in crop production have typically involved one or more of the follow 
ing three elements: (a) land and water resource development to pro 
vide a more satisfactory environment for plant growth; (b) modifica 
tion of the environment by the addition of organic and inorganic sources 
of plant nutrients to the soil to stimulate plant growth; (c) use of 
biological and chemical means to protect plants from pests and disease; 
and (d) selection and design of new biologically efficient crop varieties 
specifically adapted to respond to those elements in the environment 
that are subject to man's control. Similar processes can be observed 
in advances in animal agriculture.
The United States and Japan
One implication of the discussion of mechanical and biological pro 
cesses is that there are multiple paths of technical change in agriculture 
available to a society. The constraints imposed by an inelastic supply 
of land may be offset by advances in biological technology. The con 
straints imposed by an inelastic supply of labor may be offset by ad 
vances in mechanical technology. These alternatives are illustrated in 
figure 1. The 1880-1980 land and labor productivity growth paths for 
Japan, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States are plotted, along with the 1980 productivity ratios for a number 
of developing countries. The impression given by the several growth 
paths is that nature is relatively "plastic."
In economics, it has generally been accepted, at least since the publica 
tion of Theory of Wages by Sir John Hicks, that changes or differences 
in the relative prices of factors of production could influence the direc 
tion of invention or innovation. There has also been a second tradition, 
based on the work of Griliches and Schmookler, that has focused at 
tention on the influence of growth in product demand on the rate of 
technical change. We now turn to an illustration of the role of relative 
factor endowments and prices in the evolution of alternative paths of 
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Figure 1 Historical growth paths of agricultural productivity of Denmark, 
France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States for 
1880-1980, compared with intercountry cross-section observations 
of selected countries in 1980. Values in parentheses are percent of 
male workers employed in nonagriculture. Data from Appendixes 
A and B, Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, rev. ed., 
1985.
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Japan and the United States are characterized by extreme differences 
in relative endowments of land and labor (table 2). In 1880, total 
agricultural land area per male worker was more than 60 times as large 
in the United States as in Japan, and arable land area per worker was 
about 20 times as large in the United States as in Japan. The differences 
have widened over time. By 1980, total agricultural land area per male 
worker was more than 100 times as large and arable land area per male 
worker about 50 times as large in the United States as in Japan.
The relative prices of land and labor also differed sharply in the two 
countries. In 1880 in order to buy a hectare of arable land (compare 
row 8 and row 16 in table 2), it would have been necessary for a Japanese 
hired farm worker to work eight times as many days as a U.S. farm 
worker. In the United States, the price of labor rose relative to the price 
of land, particularly between 1880 and 1920. In Japan, the price of land 
rose sharply relative to the price of labor, particularly between 1880 
and 1900. By 1960 a Japanese farm worker would have had to work 
30 times as many days as a U.S. farm worker in order to buy one hec 
tare of arable land. This gap was reduced after 1960, partly due to ex 
tremely rapid increases in wage rates in Japan during the two decades 
of "miraculous" economic growth. In the United States, land prices 
rose sharply in the postwar period primarily because of the rising de 
mand for land for nonagricultural use and the anticipation of continued 
inflation. Yet, in 1980 a Japanese farm worker still would have had 
to work 11 times as many days as a U.S. worker to buy one hectare 
of land.
In spite of these substantial differences in land area per worker and 
in the relative prices of land and labor, both the United States and Japan 
experienced relatively rapid rates of growth in production and produc 
tivity in agriculture (tables 3 and 4). Overall agricultural growth per 
formance for the entire 100-year period was very similar in the two 
countries. In both countries, total agricultural output increased at an 
annual compound rate of 1.6 percent, while total inputs (aggregate of 
conventional inputs) increased at a rate of 0.7 percent. Total factor pro 
ductivity (total output divided by total input) increased at an annual rate 
of 0.9 percent in both countries. Meanwhile, labor productivity measured 
by agricultural output per male worker increased at rates of 3.1 per-
Table 2
Land-Labor Endowments and Relative Prices in Agriculture 
United States and Japan, Selected years
USA
(1) Agricultural land area (million ha.)
(2) Arable land area (million ha.)
(3) No. of male farm workers (thousand)
(4) (l)/(3) (ha./worker)
(5) (2)/(3) (ha./worker)
(6) Value of arable land ($/ha.)
(7) Farm wage rate ($/day)
(8) (6)/(7) (days/ha.)
Japan
(9) Agricultural land area (thousand ha.)a
(10) Arable land area (thousand ha.)
(11) No. of male farm workers (thousand)
(12) (9)/(ll) (ha./worker)
(13) (10)/(11) (ha./worker)
(14) Value of arable land (yen/ha.)









































































































SOURCE: Data from Appendix Tables C-2 and C-3 in Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, 5
rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). o
a. Agricultural land areas in Japan for 1880-1960 are estimated by multiplying arable land areas by 1.16, the ratio of agricultural land area to arable ^
land area in the 1960 Census of Agriculture; this conversion factor changed to 1.05 for 1980 based on the 1980 Census of Agriculture. <-rt
Table 3
Average Annual Rates of Change (Percentage per Year) 
in Output, Inputs, and Productivity in U.S. Agriculture, 1870-1979











































SOURCES: Data from USDA, Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency (Washington, D.C. 1979); and D.D. Durost and G.T. Barton, Changing
Sources of Farm Output (Washington, D.C.: USDA Production Research Report No. 36, February 1960). Data are three-year averages centered on
the year shown for 1925, 1950 and 1965.
a. Number of workers, 1870-1910; worker-hour basis, 1910-1971.
b. Cropland use for crops, including crop failures and cultivated summer fallow.
Table 4 

















































SOURCES: Data from Saburo Yamada and Yujiro Hayami, "Agricultural Growth in Japan, 1880-1970," in Agricultural Growth m Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea and the Philippines, Yujiro Hayami, Vernon W. Ruttan and Herman Southworth, eds. (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979), pp. 33-58; 
Saburo Yamada, "The Secular Trends m Input-Output Relations of Agricultural Production in Japan, 1878-1978," a paper presented at the Conference 
of Agricultural Development in China, Japan, and Korea, Academica Siruca, Taipel, December 17-20, 1980, Saburo Yamada, Country Study on Agricultural 





cent per year in the United States and 2.7 percent in Japan. It is 
remarkable that the overall growth rates in output and productivity were 
so similar, despite the extremely different factor proportions that 
characterize the two countries.
Although there is a resemblance in the overall rates of growth in pro 
duction and productivity, the time sequences of the relatively fast- 
growing phases and the relatively stagnant phases differ between the 
two countries. In the United States, agricultural output grew rapidly 
up to 1900; then the growth rate decelerated. From the 1900s to the 
1930s there was little gain in total productivity. This stagnation phase 
was succeeded by a dramatic rise in production and productivity in the 
1940s and 1950s. Japan experienced rapid increases in agricultural pro 
duction and productivity from 1880 to the 1910s, then entered into a 
stagnation phase, which lasted until the mid-1930s. Another rapid ex 
pansion phase commenced during the period of recovery from the 
devastation of World War n. Roughly speaking, the United States ex 
perienced a stagnation phase two decades earlier than Japan and also 
shifted to the second development phase two decades earlier.
The effect of relative prices on the development and choice of 
technology is illustrated with remarkable clarity for biological technology 
in figure 2. In figure 2, U.S. and Japanese data on the relationship be 
tween fertilizer input per hectare of arable land and the fertilizer/land 
price ratio are plotted for the period 1880 to 1980. In both 1880 and 
1980, U.S. farmers were using less fertilizer than Japanese farmers. 
Despite enormous differences in both physical and institutional resources, 
however, the relationship between these variables has been almost iden 
tical in the two countries. As the price of fertilizer declined relative 
to other factors, scientists in both countries responded by inventing crop 
varieties that were more responsive to the lower prices of fertilizer. 
American scientists, however, always lagged behind the Japanese by 
several decades because the lower prices of land relative to the price 
of fertilizer in the United States resulted in a lower priority being plac 
ed on yield-increasing technology.
The effect of changes in the relative prices of mechanical power and 

























Fertilizer-Arable Land Price Ratio (Log.)
Figure 2 Relation between fertilizer input per hectare of arable land and 
fertilizer-arable land price ratio (=hectares of arable land which can 
be purchased by one ton of N+P2O5 +K2O contained in commer 
cial fertilizers), the United Sates and Japan, quinquennial observa 
tions for 1880-1980. Data from Appendix C, Hay ami and Ruttan, 
Agricultural Development, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985).
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3. In both 1880 and 1980, U.S. farmers were using more mechanical 
power than Japanese farmers. The relationship between the power-labor 
price ratio and the use of power per worker is almost identical in the 
two countries, but because labor was always less expensive in Japan, 
the Japanese suppliers of mechanical technology always lagged behind 
U.S. suppliers by several decades. These same relationships that hold 
for Japan and the United States have now been demonstrated for the 
period 1880-1960 for a number of European countries in the book by 
Hans P. Binswanger and Veraon W. Ruttan, Induced Innovation: 
Technology, Institutions and Development.
The effect of a rise in the price of fertilizer relative to the price of 
land or in the price of labor relative to the price of machinery has been 
to induce advances in biological and mechanical technology. The ef 
fect of the introduction of lower cost and more productive biological 
and mechanical technology has been to induce farmers to substitute fer 
tilizer for land and mechanical power for labor. These responses to dif 
ferences in resource endowments among countries and to changes in 
resource endowments over time by agricultural research institutions, 
by the farm supply industries, and by farmers, has been remarkably 
similar in spite of differences in cultures and traditions.
The results of our comparative analyses can be summarized as follows: 
Agricultural growth in the United States and Japan during the period 
1880-1980 can best be understood when viewed as a dynamic factor 
substitution process. Factors have been substituted for each other along 
a metaproduction function in response to long-run trends in relative factor 
prices. Each point on the metaproduction surface is characterized by 
a technology which can be described in terms of specific sources of 
power, types of machinery, crop varieties, and animal breeds. 
Movements along this metaproduction surface involve technical changes. 
These technical changes have been induced to a significant extent by 















Power-Labor Price Ratio (Log.)
Figure 3 Relation between farm draft power per male worker and power-labor 
price ratio (=hectares of work days which can be purchased by one 
horsepower of tractor or draft animal), the United States and Japan, 
quinquennial observations for 1880-1980. Data from Appendix C, 
Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, rev. ed. Number 
of male workers=U3 and J3, Power=U7+U8 and J7+J8, Land 
price=U 19 and J19, Power price=average retail price of tractor 
per horsepower extrapolated by U21 from the 1976-80 average of 
$216 for the United States, and extrapolated by J21 from the average 
of 65,170 yen for Japan
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Perspective
In the closing decades of the twentieth century we are approaching 
the end of the most remarkable transitions in the history of agriculture.
Prior to the beginning of this century, almost all increases in 
agricultural production occurred as a result of increases in area cultivated. 
The major exceptions were in Western Europe, where livestock-based 
conservation systems of farming had developed, and in East Asia, where 
wet rice cultivation systems had developed.
But by the end of this century there will be few significant areas where 
agricultural production can be expanded by simply adding more land 
to production. Expansion of agricultural output will have to be obtain 
ed almost entirely from more intensive cultivation of the areas already 
being used for agricultural production. Increases in food and fiber pro 
duction will depend, in large measure, on continuous advances in 
agricultural technology.
The task before us is clear. It is imperative, over the next several 
decades, that we complete the establishment of agricultural research 
capacity for each commodity of economic significance in each 
agroclimatic region of the world.
A developing country which fails to evolve a capacity for technical 
and institutional innovation in agriculture consistent with its resource 
and cultural endowments suffers two major constraints on its attempts 
to develop a productive agriculture. It is unable to take advantage of 
advances in biological and chemical technologies suited to labor-intensive 
agricultural systems. And the mechanical technology it does import from 
more developed countries will be productive only under conditions of 
large-scale agricultural organization. It will contribute to the emergence 
of a "bimodal" rather than a "unimodal" organization structure.
During the last two decades a number of developing countries have 
begun to establish the institutional capacity to generate technical changes 
adapted to national and regional resource endowments. More recently, 
these emerging national systems have been buttressed by a new system 
of international crop and animal research institutes. These new institutes 
have become both important soures of new knowledge and technology
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and increasingly effective communication links among the developing 
national research systems.
The lag in shifting from a natural resource-based to a science-based 
system of agriculture continues to be a source of national differences 
in land and labor productivity. Lags in the development and applica 
tion of knowledge are also important sources of regional productivity 
differences within countries. In countries such as Mexico and Pakistan, 
differential rates of technical change have been an important source of 
the widening disparities in the rate of growth of total agricultural out 
put, in labor and land productivity, and in incomes and wage rates among 
regions.
Productivity differences in agriculture are increasingly a function of 
investments in scientific and industrial capacity and in the education 
of rural people rather than of natural resource endowments. The ef 
fects of education on productivity are particularly important during 
periods in which a nation's agricultural research system begins to in 
troduce new technology. In an agricultural system characterized by static 
technology, there are few gains to be realized from education in rural 
areas. Rural people who have lived for generations with essentially the 
same resources and the same technology have learned from long ex 
perience what their efforts can get out of the resources available to them. 
Children acquire from their parents the skills that are worthwhile. For 
mal schooling has little economic value in agricultural production.
As soon as new technical opportunities become available, this situa 
tion changes. Technical change requires the acquisition of new husbandry 
skills; acquisition from nontraditional sources of additional resources 
such as new seeds, new chemicals, and new equipment; and develop 
ment of new skills in dealing with both natural resources and with the 
input and product market institutions that link agriculture with the 
nonagricultural sector.
The processes by which new knowledge can be applied to alter the 
rate and direction of technical change in agriculture, are, however, 
substantially greater than our knowledge of the processes by which 
resources are brought to bear on the process of institutional innovation 
and transfer. Yet the need for viable institutions capable of supporting 
more rapid agricultural growth and rural development is even more com 




Agricultural and Rural Development
Bruce F. Johnston 
Stanford University
The term political economy went out of fashion decades ago because 
economists wanted to concentrate on rigorous analysis of the strictly 
economic aspects of problems. The term has come back in favor, 
however, for many of us concerned with problems of development. We 
recognize that we simply cannot afford to ignore the political dimen 
sion that is so important to our understanding of the real world 
problems and opportunities. LasswelTs classic definition of politics  
who gets what, when, and how? is also a fine definition of the political 
economy of development. In brief, political constraints are as impor 
tant as the scarcity of economic resources in determining those things 
that are feasible and not merely desirable.
In addressing this large topic, I want to deal in summary fashion with 
three key questions.
My first question is, simply, why focus on agricultural and rural 
development?
Second, why should we in this country be concerned about the develop 
ment problems of Kenya, India, and other third world countries?
Third, what have economists in general and this particular 
agricultural economist learned in the last 40 years about the critical 
elements or ingredients of successful strategies for agricultural and rural 
development?




For the less-developed countries that still have very low incomes  
the Indias, Kenyas, or Indonesias in contrast with middle-income coun 
tries such as South Korea, Brazil, or Taiwan, some 60 to 80 percent 
of the population and labor force still depend on agriculture for their 
livelihood for employment and income. 1 And it is not necessary to 
dwell on the fact that food is one of the most basic of * 'Basic Human 
Needs." (See Mellor and Johnston 1984.)
On my second question, as to why we as Americans should be con 
cerned about the development problems of third world countries, there 
are many answers. Let me mention two that I find persuasive.
The first answer boils down to this: We are part of the problem and 
therefore have a moral, a human obligation to try to be part of the solu 
tion. The most obvious way in which we are part of the problem is 
that we the U.S., the countries of Western Europe, and the World 
Health Organization and other international institutions (including the 
Kellogg, Rockefeller, and Ford Foundations) are mainly responsible 
for the explosive growth rates of population that became universal among 
the less-developed countries during the decades following World War 
n. I am referring, of course, to the opening up of access to immuniza 
tion programs and other modern public health technologies and to modern 
medical knowledge. This lowering of death rates above all by reduc 
ing infant and child mortality has been a blessing for the families that 
have been spared the wastage of human life when, as was often the case, 
one out of three infants died before the age of five. Like many transfers 
of modern technology, however, it has been a two-edged sword. We 
have learned that it is much easier for external interventions to bring 
about a rapid reduction in death rates than in birth rates. Clearly, it 
is the dramatic decline in death rates from crude death rates of 40 to 
50 per thousand to current levels of 10 to 25 per thousand that has 
given rise to the explosive growth of population of the past 35 years. 
(Johnston and Clark 1982, pp. 47-60.)
Again, this is a problem that applies particularly to the low-income 
countries. It also applies with special force to the countries of tropical 
Africa and not only because so many of the low-income countries are 
in the region. In fact, tropical Africa is the one region in the world where
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rates of population growth are continuing to increase because death rates 
are continuing to fall and birth rates are virtually unchanged.
The situation in Kenya epitomizes the way in which the task of rais 
ing per capita incomes has been made exceedingly difficult because of 
the emergence and persistence of very high rates of population growth. 
During the demographic transition in Western Europe and Japan, the 
period of rapid population growth was charaterized by rates of increase 
of about 1.5 percent, compared to an estimated rate of 4 percent in 
Kenya. It is the nature of population growth to proceed at a compound 
rate. An upsurge in infant and child survival this year means an up 
surge in the rate of increase in women of child-bearing age beginning 
15 to 20 years from now. Hence the momentum of population growth 
that demographers emphasize. A growth rate of 4 percent means that 
a population will double in just over 17 years and will increase seven 
times in 50 years. At first glance, a population growth rate of 2 percent 
doesn't seem all that different a population doubling time of 35 years 
instead of 17. But continuation of a 2 percent compound rate for 50 
years implies an increase of' 'only" 2.7 times compared to a sevenfold 
increase with a 4 percent growth rate.
Demographic projections for Kenya offer a striking example. For the 
55-year period 1969 to 2024, the "most likely" set of assumptions point 
to an increase in Kenya's population from 11 million to 64 million. Those 
projections also considered the prospective change in the urban-rural 
composition of the country's labor force. Assuming continued rapid 
growth of the urban workforce, the rural workforce is projected to 
decline from 87 percent of the total in 1969 to 65 percent in 2024. In 
spite of the projected sixteen/old increase in the population of working 
age in urban areas, however, the rural workforce would still increase 
fourfold over that 55-year period (Shah and Willekens 1978). Those 
projections emphasize an important structural characteristic of coun 
tries with rapid population growth and where the share of the popula 
tion dependent on agriculture is still very high.
But before I turn to the implications of these structural/demographic 
characteristics on the choice of an agricultural strategy, let me mention
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another fundamental reason why I believe that it is important for the 
U.S. to continue to play an important role in providing economic and 
technical assistance for the contemporary low-income countries. 
Throughout most of human history poverty was widespread, but it was 
not perceived as a problem in the way it is today. Instead, it was seen 
as part of the natural order. ' 'The poor are always with us." Their plight 
should be alleviated by charity, but poverty was not viewed as a condi 
tion that could and should be eliminated by well-designed and vigorously 
implemented development efforts. However, with the remarkable ad 
vances that have been made in science and technology, the develop 
ment goal of eliminating poverty has become a real possibility, not mere 
ly a Utopian dream. (See Simon 1984.)
I turn now to the question of what economists and this agricultural 
economist have learned about the development process during the past 
40 years. And that will bring me back to the implications of those struc 
tural/demographic characteristics of today's low-income developing 
countries.
But first I want to draw on my work in Japan in the years immediate 
ly after World War n. With the benefit of a lot of hindsight, I see that 
I am very fortunate to have been influenced so strongly by Japan's ex 
perience as my implicit "model" of agricultural development. During 
the critically formative period of the late 19th century and the early 
decades of the 20th century, increases in agricultural productivity con 
tributed in some very important ways to the overall economic develop 
ment of Japan. (See Ohkawa, Johnston, and Kaneda 1969; Johnston 
and Kilby 1975, chap. 5.) Three features of that experience were 
especially significant.
1. Agricultural production was increased within the unchanged 
organizational framework of Japan's existing small-scale farming system. 
Between 1880 and 1960, Japan's agricultural production increased about 
3-1/2 times, slightly more than the increase in the U.S. over the same 
80-year period. Because of technological change, specifically increases 
in the productivity of the existing on-farm resources of land and labor, 
this was achieved with remarkably small demands on the critically scarce 
resources of capital and foreign exchange.
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2. Most of the nation's farmers were involved in increases in 
agricultural productivity associated with the use of improved crop 
varieties, fertilizers and other types of working capital but remarkably 
little investment in farm machinery or other types of long-term capital 
investment. Technological change related to high-yield, fertilizer- 
responsive crop varieties was the driving force in increasing agricultural 
productivity. And the technical innovations and new purchased inputs 
were divisible. Therefore they could be used efficiently by small farmers 
subject to a severe purchasing power constraint. And the typical farmer 
unavoidably faced a purchasing power constraint. The cash income ac 
cruing to the agricultural sector was limited because of the struc 
tural/demographic characteristics emphasized earlier. When the number 
of farm households is still large relative to the domestic population depen 
dent on purchased food, the cash income accruing to the average farm 
unit is inevitably small. When a country's pattern of agricultural develop 
ment is dualistic, so that a relatively small number of atypically large 
and capital-intensive farm enterprises account for the lion's share of 
commercial production, those large farms escape the purchasing power 
constraint. But that is at the expense of intensifying the cash income 
and purchasing power constraint for the great majority of small farm 
units.
3. Agricultural and industrial growth went forward together in a pro 
cess of concurrent growth. As the overwhelmingly agrarian character 
of the Japanese economy was gradually transformed by the process of 
economic growth, there were positive interactions between agriculture 
and industry. Moreover, the concurrent progress in agriculture and in 
dustry led to decentralized industrial development of a "semi-modern" 
industrial sector that relied upon relatively simple, capital-saving, labor- 
using technologies, which made possible more rapid growth of output 
in both sectors.
I want to dwell particularly on the first and second factors and the 
importance of technological change. All of the speakers in this seminar 
series are, I believe, in agreement on the great importance of 
technological change. This potential importance of technological change 
as a source of agricultural growth has some very important implica 
tions for the design of development strategies.
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One terribly important implication is that we need to be as concern 
ed with investments in human and institutional resources as in physical 
investments such as construction of irrigation systems or building fac 
tories for manufacturing farm equipment. James Bonnen, a distinguished 
professor of agricultural economics at Michigan State University, has 
emphasized that agricultural progress in the U.S. has been the result 
of interactions within a system of developmental institutions: farmers 
and their organizations, the United States Department of Agriculture 
and the land-grant colleges and universities, the Federal-State 
Agricultural Research and Extension programs, private sector firms 
engaged in the marketing and processing of farm products and the 
manufacture and distribution of farm inputs, and the federal and state 
political institutions involved in the formulation of agricultural policy. 
(See Bonnen 1987.) Experience in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and many 
other countries has demonstrated that efficient agricultural progress 
depends on the interacting effects of farm-level factors and what, for 
lack of a better term, I refer to as socially determined factors. The farm- 
level factors include the responsiveness of farmers to incentives and 
their investments of time and money in land improvement, in equip 
ment, in fertilizers and other forms of working capital, and in acquir 
ing knowledge and skills. The socially determined factors include educa 
tional institutions, investments in agricultural research, extension, and 
infrastructure, macroeconomic policies (e.g., monetary policy and in 
terest rates), and a host of factors affecting the marketing of farm prod 
ucts and the distribution of inputs.
The twofold implication of recognizing the great potential importance 
of technological change concerns the need for investments in the various 
forms of capital physical, human, and institutional to be reasonably 
well-balanced. It is easy to state the economic principle. The rate of 
return on the last dollar invested in each type of capital should be ap 
proximately equal. But to realize that ideal in practice is enormously 
difficult. The emphasis by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) on "induced in 
novation" and the importance of avoiding price distortions is an im 
portant part of the answer. However, the decisions to make the long- 
term investment in building supporting institutions, including educa 
tional institutions to train agricultural scientists and administrators, re-
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quires a vision, even a faith, that goes beyond perceiving trends in 
relative prices. Lessons of past historial experience can be enormously 
helpful provided that they are well understood and properly interpreted. 
I believe that I have been very fortunate to have had an opportunity 
to learn about Japan's experience when I was still very young and im 
pressionable. Every country confronts a unique set of problems. But 
I am persuaded that Japan's past experience is of much greater relevance 
to today's developing countries than the historical experience of the 
United States.
Another important lesson of past experience concerns the relative ad 
vantages of the public and private sectors in achieving successful 
agricultural development. The first proposition that I would stress is 
that we have to move beyond a doctrinaire faith in either government 
planning and direct action by government, or the equally blind faith 
in the private sector and "the magic of the market place." Experience 
in the U.S., in Japan and in many other countries demonstrates that 
successful agricultural development depends on an interacting system 
of public and private institutions.
There are good theoretical reasons and much evidence to support the 
view that independent private firms have a comparative advantage over 
public agencies in carrying out essentially commercial functions such 
as production or marketing farm products or distributing farm inputs. 
This is essentially because the hierarchical techniques of decisionmak- 
ing and operating within a bureaucracy are at a disadvantage as com 
pared to the greater flexibility and the capacity and motivation for cost- 
minimization that characterize private firms responding to price and 
profit signals within a market system. It is equally important to stress, 
however, that a number of the socially determined factors that are of 
critical importance depend upon the public sector. This is because public 
agencies are needed to make available critical public goods such as educa 
tion, agricultural research, extension, and family planning services. It 
is a defining characteristic of public goods and services that they will 
be provided in less than the socially optimal amount if their availability 
depends on private firms responding to private demands. Even from 
a strictly economic point of view, society's benefits from investing in
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education, for example, exceed the private returns accruing to those 
who receive the education.
Finally, I want to make a few comments about the role of food aid. 
This is a complex and controversial topic. Some people who stress that 
the world's food problems are "merely a matter of distribution" con 
clude that sending our "surplus food" is a neat and simple answer. 
Food aid shipments are essential for famine relief. They are not the 
answer to the fundamental problems of poverty. And it is their poverty 
that makes poor countries so vulnerable to famine.
I sympathize with the prime minister who wanted to find a one-handed 
economist because he (or was it she?) was fed up with "on the one 
hand, on the other hand" answers. But there's no getting away from 
the complexity that characterizes food aid. Food aid can be used to pro 
mote development. It can and, I believe, often does have adverse ef 
fects on incentives to increase food production in a low-income, develop 
ing country. But rather than spend a lot of time trying to spell out the 
conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for food aid to have a positive 
impact, let me give you, as an illustration, my view on the food aid 
balance sheet for India. It seems to me that for the 1950s and up to 
the mid-1960s, it is difficult to say whether food aid yielded significant 
net benefits for India. Its greatest value was probably in saving foreign 
exchange that could be used to finance other imports including, for ex 
ample, equipment for fertilizer factories and for irrigation facilities. 
But its availability undoubtedly had an adverse effect on farm prices 
and farmers' incentives. In addition, it probably weakened the resolve 
of the government to face up to the country's agricultural problems. 
There is no doubt in my mind that dollar-for-dollar the food aid was 
less valuable than, say, the investments that enabled some of our land- 
grant universities to assist in establishing a network of agricultural univer 
sities in India and in creating a more effective national agricultural 
research system. But that ignores two important political economy dimen 
sions of the issue.
First, there is no doubt that to some extent the food aid was addi 
tional to other forms of aid. As long as agricultural "surpluses" are 
created as a by-product of our agricultural price support programs,
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there is bound to be pressure in Congress to convert those "costly and 
burdensome surpluses" into a "valuable food resource." Second, I am 
convinced that the blunt way in which Lyndon B. Johnson carried out 
his "short tether" policy in making aid available to India during the 
acute famine in 1966 and 1967 resulting from two successive years of 
drought had powerful and positive consequences. There was great resent 
ment among Indian politicians, policy makers, and officials at many levels 
at being treated in that way, e.g., in imposing many harsh "conditions 
precedent." Indeed the Indians involved were so infuriated that the 
episode created a resolve to never again be so dependent on food relief 
shipments. And fortunately the prior investments in strengthening In 
dia's human and institutional resources as well as U.S. and World Bank 
investments in expanding irrigation facilities and fertilizer manufacturing 
capacity meant that India's interacting system of developmental institu 
tions could meet the challenge of virtually ending India's dependence 
on imported food.
In recent years, there has been a very substantial increase in food 
aid to countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Johnston et al. 1987, chap. 2). 2 
Because of the tight budget situation in the U.S., together with current 
concern over the financial difficulties of American farmers as a result 
of the recent decline in agricultural exports and in farm prices, there 
is pressure to further expand food aid shipments; and exaggerated claims 
are being made about the benefits to be realized from such shipments. 
(See, for example, Reutlinger and Katona-Apte 1987.) Providing food 
aid as a substitute for commercial imports would help to ease the serious 
balance-of-payments problems faced by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As noted by Timmer in his chapter, however, using food aid to replace 
commercial imports is contrary to the intent and the regulations that 
are supposed to govern food aid programs of the U.S. and other coun 
tries. Moreover, sustained solutions to Africa's serious food and 
agricultural problems require economic and technical assistance to sup 
port the strengthening of national agricultural research systems and 
postsecondary educational institutions for training agricultural scien 
tists and administrators, together with investments in expanding, 
rehabilitating, and maintaining rural transport networks and other rural.
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infrastructure. Use of a certain amount of food aid for rural works pro 
jects could have a positive developmental impact, although such pro 
jects make substantial demands on scarce administrative and planning 
capacity. It is essential to recognize that food aid cannot be a substitute 
for supporting the long-term institution-building that is so desperately 
needed in Sub-Saharan Africa.
NOTES
1. The distinctive problems of such "late-developing" countries are examined in Johnston and 
Kilby (1975) and Johnston and Clark (1982).
2. For historical reasons, Africa has not been the focus of U.S. economic assistance. Since 1978, 
U.S. assistance to Africa has amounted to a little over 10 percent of the country's foreign aid 
to all regions; but prior to 1978, Africa received only about 5 percent of the total. For the six 
countries Senegal.Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi included in the World 
Bank's study of Managing Agricultural Development in Africa (MADIA), AID's bilateral assistance 
for projects and programs during the period 1963-84 amounted to $905 million in constant 1983 
dollars or only a little more than the $836 million provided as food aid (Johnston et al. 1987, 
chap. 2, table 3).
Political Economy 45 
REFERENCES
Bonnen, James T. "U.S. Agricultural Development: Transforming Human 
Capital, Technology, and Institutions" in U.S.-Mexico Relations: 
Agriculture and Rural Development, edited by Bruce Johnston, et al. (Stan 
ford University Press, 1987).
Hay ami, Yujiro and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An 
International Perspective, rev. ed. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1985).
Johnston, Bruce F. and William C. Clark, Redesigning Rural Development: 
A Strategic Perspective. (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982).
Johnston, Bruce F., Allan Hoben, Dirk W. Dijkerman, William K. Jaeger, An 
Assessment of A. I.D. Activities to Promote Agricultural and Rural Develop 
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa. (World Bank, Development Strategies Divi 
sion, Development Research Department, 1987).
Johnston, Bruce F. and Peter Kilby, Agriculture and Structural Transformation: 
Economic Strategies in Late-Developing Countries. (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1975).
Mellor, John W. and Brace F. Johnston, "The World Food Equation: Inter 
relations Among Development, Employment, and Food Consumption," 
Journal of Economic Literature 22(2), June 1984, pp. 531-574.
Ohkawa, Kazuchi and B.F. Johnston, Hiromitsu Kaneda, eds., Agriculture 
and Economic Growth: Japan's Experience (University of Tokyo Press, 
Tokyo, 1969).
Reutlinger, S. and J. Katona-Apte, "The Nutritional Impact of Food Aid: 
Criteria for the Selection of Cost-Effective Foods," in Food Policy: In 
tegrating Supply, Distribution, and Consumption, edited by J. Price 
Gittinger, Joanne Leslie and Caroline Hoisinger. (Johns Hopkins Univer 
sity Press, Baltimore, 1987).
Shah, M.M. and F. Willekens, Rural-Urban Population Projections for Kenya 
and Implications for Development. (International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1978).
Simon, Arthur, Bread for the World. (Paulist Press, New York, 1984).
World Bank, ' 'A Summary Report of World Bank/World Food Programme 
Consultation of Food Aid for Structural and Sectoral Adjustment." (World 




Implications of the Past 25 Years




Why should we be interested in understanding the interactions of 
foreign assistance with the agricultural development of developing coun 
tries? First, because foreign assistance plays a major role in the expen 
ditures of low-income developing countries. In Africa currently, from 
30 percent to 60 percent of government expenditures in many coun 
tries come from foreign aid, and the share of government expenditures 
in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of African countries ranges from 
25 percent to 35 percent. Even in a large country such as India, at its 
peak foreign assistance constituted close to a quarter of the gross domestic 
investment.
Second, development of the agricultural sector plays an important 
role in the overall economic development of countries at early stages 
of development, and governments need to play an important role in 
developing agriculture due to the "public goods" nature of many in 
vestments such as agricultural research, extension and physical in 
frastructure. These investments require lumpy capital and skills for their 
development. Small farmers with low incomes cannot mobilize resources 
on their own on a scale needed to establish such infrastructure, especially 
as the benefits derived from such investments have long gestation lags. 
Besides, they are not easily captured and recovered through direct cost 
recovery, hence the important role for government at early stages of 
development.
I am grateful to Paul Fishstein for research assistance and to Kirn Tran for typing the paper.
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Third, the contribution of foreign assistance to government activity 
consists not simply of financial transfers, but also of the transfer of ideas 
in the form of policy advice, skills provided through technical assistance 
which accompanies investment decisions, and institutional development 
through such means as the transfer of western "models," as for in 
stance the U.S.-type land-grant colleges for agricultural research and 
extension. These various nonfinancial transfers can have a profound 
effect on the efficiency with which financial resources are utilized by 
the recipient countries and thus on the pace of growth of production 
and productivity. The level, stability and content of foreign assistance 
are strongly influenced by the international economic and political en 
vironment. It is important to explore the important dimensions of this 
environment to see its impact on the nature of foreign assistance as well 
as on its effectiveness.
The process of agricultural development is, however, in large measure 
determined by the resource endowments, policies, institutions and 
technological possibilities in the recipient countries. The extent to which 
an environment conducive to agricultural development exists depends 
largely on the way policymakers in developing countries perceive the 
role of the agricultural sector, and the extent to which they put in place 
the means to foster development.
The African situation offers a good example of the interaction be 
tween domestic and international factors. The problems of African coun 
tries' agricultural sectors have been at the center of international atten 
tion since the late 1970s because of the broadly shared international 
view that domestic policy failures largely explain their slow pace of 
development. Much "aid weariness" has developed because of the 
perceived failure of foreign aid to solve the problems of agricultural 
development in Africa. In the 1950s and 1960s, countries in Asia went 
through similar periods of balance-of-payments crises resulting from 
the failures of their agricultural exports and increased food (and in 
dustrial) imports. They too were seen to be increasing their dependence 
on food and financial aid from developed countries and there did not 
seem to be any hope of their ever being able to reach the stage of food 
self-sufficiency and sustained agricultural growth. Many of them, such
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as India, Pakistan, Indonesia and even Bangladesh, have now reached 
a position of food self-sufficiency, and some (e.g., India, Pakistan and 
Indonesia) have become modest exporters of food. Important insights 
can be derived from the experience of Asia regarding the content of 
foreign aid, and especially the way it affected domestic policies, resource 
endowments and institutions, which in turn enabled Asian countries to 
develop agriculture. It is interesting to consider whether parallel 
possibilities exist in Africa.
There has been reluctance to indulge in such comparative analysis 
on grounds that few useful lessons can be learned from Asian countries 
which had far superior initial endowments in the form of trained man 
power and institutional capacity. These may not be reproduceable in 
the African countries. A great deal of foreign aid to Africa, on the other 
hand, has already involved a relatively simplistic application of far more 
advanced western technologies, institutions and changing conceptions 
of development. The effects of aid from OECD countries to African 
agriculture over the last quarter-century constitute the subject of a ma 
jor research project under my direction. Also, in providing such aid, 
frequently the wrong lessons have been learned from the Asian ex 
perience and applied to the African continent. For instance, the Indian 
type of complex, centralized, multisectoral planning models were trendy 
in the 1960s and were applied in Nigeria's early plans by western ad 
visors. Concern about increased inequalities following the Green Revolu 
tion in Asia resulted in donors in the 1970s placing an excessive em 
phasis in Africa on integrated agricultural development of the regions 
and populations with few resources and growth possibilities in the short 
run. Such investment in agricultural and rural development resulted in 
a large number of failed projects leading neither to growth nor equity. 
Similarly, the concerns about the growing ranks of the educated 
unemployed derived from the Asian experience in the 1970s lead the 
international development community to underrate the fundamental im 
portance of investment in education and training in African countries 
in the advice and investments they offered.
Since the technological, institutional, skilled manpower and physical 
resource endowments of many Asian countries are closer to those of
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Africa in some respects than the solutions derived directly either from 
the West or from these various western perceptions of the relevance 
of the Asian experience to Africa, it might be fruitful to make direct 
comparisons between the two continents to determine more precisely 
where lessons are transferable and where they are not. For instance, 
semi-aridness is a major reason for Africa's poor agricultural perfor 
mance. India has two-thirds of the world's cultivable area that is classified 
as semi-arid and Africa has one-third. It is instructive, therefore, to 
examine where growth in agricultural production occurred in India and 
why, and to examine the implications for Africa's prospects in semi- 
arid agriculture. Similarly, small-scale irrigation and low-level 
agricultural technology used extensively in Asia can benefit Africa in 
place of the tractorized schemes and large-scale irrigation dams financed 
by foreign aid to date. As a prototype of the Asian case, I will explore 
the sources of growth in India's agriculture, the causes of that growth, 
and the role that foreign aid has played in that process to derive in 
sights for the development of African agriculture. To do so, I first review 
the international economic environment which currently determines the 
level, size and sources of foreign aid to Africa and which influenced 
these levels in India. I then outline briefly the motivations of aid as they 
determine the type and certainty of aid. This in turn influences the ex 
tent to which recipient country policymakers feel that they can rely on 
external financing as a source of government expenditures. I then ex 
amine the role of agriculture in economic development. Afterwards, 
by reviewing India's agricultural development experience and the role 
of foreign assistance in the process, I identify the sources of India's 
agricultural growth and the causes of that growth. I then examine the 
similarities and differences in the domestic policy environments and 
aid between the African countries and India to draw implications from 
the comparative experience for future agricultural development in Africa.
The International Environment for Aid
The rapid growth in agricultural production in North America, Europe 
and Japan since the mid-1970s has greatly increased the world surplus
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stocks of grain in the 1980s. This situation is radically different from 
the period in the 1960s when India was the major beneficiary of con 
cessional aid. Then the United States was the only major source of 
surplus food and foreign aid and thus the dominant source of advice, 
institutional innovations and new technological possibilities introduc 
ed in the agricultural sector in India. The sources of aid to the develop 
ing world have greatly diversified since then, as has the prosperity among 
western nations. For instance, a large number of Western European 
countries and Japan as well as Eastern Bloc countries are giving con 
cessional assistance to Africa. Consequently, ideas in the form of policy 
advice, investments, and institutional and technological possibilities and 
skills introduced through foreign aid into African agriculture are highly 
diverse, frequently creating much confusion on the African scene. This 
is especially the case as the ability of African governments to distinguish 
between the quality of advice and assistance is greatly limited due to 
their own limited capacity in terms erf trained manpower and institutions.
While the sources and levels of food and financial aid have increased 
steadily until the early 1980s, they also contain the danger of providing 
a false sense of security to the recipients, reducing the urgency of deal 
ing with domestic policies which often inhibit the development of 
agriculture. Concessional aid levels to Africa have declined from 1984 
levels as a result of concern about aid effectiveness and also the reces 
sionary trends in OECD countries. Willingness of the African govern 
ments to adjust their domestic policies has in turn been influenced by 
their concern about the decline in aid level and also by the need for 
increased national self-reliance. The differing views of the diverse donors 
adds to the confusion on policy adjustments in Africa.
While the broad general directions of policy reforms are clear enough, 
there is much disagreement as to the speed with which such reforms 
can be implemented, the size of benefits that will ensue from the reforms 
and the speed with which the benefits will accrue. The large agricultural 
surpluses of the OECD countries have changed the international markets 
and prices by causing a downward pressure on world agricultural prices; 
this has been reinforced by the countries in Asia becoming exporters, 
a situation which did not exist in the 1960s. Developing countries of
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Africa on the one hand face lower real prices for their agricultural ex 
ports due to these surpluses of commodities such as sugar, edible oil, 
etc., and on the other hand suffer from the competition of low-cost im 
ported cereals. Meanwhile, their own domestic food production con 
stitutes the major source of employment and income for a great ma 
jority of their populations, with over 60 percent of their cultivated area 
under cereal production. Cheap food imports can increase the real in 
comes of urban populations, but by depressing internal terms of trade 
they can reduce the incomes of agricultural producers in developing 
countries, especially if there is no growth in the productivity of their 
agriculture to compensate for these price declines. If African countries, 
in addition, face large deficits in their balance of payments resulting 
from a combination of their own failed import-substituting industrializa 
tion policies of the 1970s and also the recessionary world market forces 
referred to above which have reduced the prices of their exports, this 
explains the need for macroeconomic reform in their countries to ad 
just to the changing world market. An increase in the domestic 
agricultural factor productivity which will reduce the cost of African 
production and make it more competitive with cheap agricultural im 
ports or exports of competitors is thus the most important way to avert 
further decline in the real incomes of African countries.
Motivations of Aid
Aid is prompted by many reasons. Recipients have preferred to think 
of aid much in the way that Senator Fulbright considered it, namely, 
as a form of progressive international taxation in which a small share 
of the income of high-income countries is mobilized and transferred 
to their low-income counterparts for the latter's development. Since 
developing countries are dependent on primary commodity exports, the 
prices of which fluctuate more than those of manufactured goods and 
services exported by developed countries, these countries have argued 
for aid so as to stabilize their export income. The concept of aid as 
a form of income transfer, however, has not had a broad appeal in the
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United States, although a large majority tends to be in favour of emergen 
cy aid on humanitarian grounds. Public opinion surveys show, for in 
stance, that while 79 percent of those interviewed in the U.S. approv 
ed of emergency aid only 49 percent supported long-term development 
assistance.
Aid, is course, also given by developed countries to meet their 
strategic, military or foreign policy concerns. In the case of aid pro 
grams of the United States, this has often resulted in assistance being 
highly concentrated on a few countries of the world, regardless of their 
developmental needs. U.S. aid levels to specific countries have also 
been quite unstable, depending on changes in those foreign policy or 
strategic considerations. Aid given to create long-term markets for the 
goods and services produced in the developed countries has more recently 
simply resulted in the disposal of surpluses existing in the OECD coun 
tries in the form of commodities, trained manpower or underutilized 
industrial capacity. Such desire for surplus disposal frequently results in 
tying of financial aid to the supply of equipment or trained manpower 
of the donor country, which may not be the most desirable for the 
development of recipient countries.
Motivations for aid may thus greatly affect the size, as well as the 
form and stability, of aid. Aid-giving countries may also refuse to share 
the secrets of their success so as to avoid future competition from reci 
pients. Aid may thus increase dependence of recipients in the short run 
without the possibility of its leading to self-reliance in the long run. 
This is, of course, a greater problem with bilateral than multilateral 
aid such as that of the World Bank, which is not tied to a particular 
source and is not related to strategic and military interests of individual 
countries.
Interaction of Foreign Aid with Domestic Policies
We now move on to consider the interaction of the level, form and 
stability of aid with the motivations for aid and its effects on the domestic 
policies of recipient countries by taking the example of India. Nearly 
60 percent of the $10 billion of U.S. aid received by India between 1949
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and 1982 was given in the form of food aid, another 20 percent in the 
form of nonproject aid, and only 17 percent in the form of project loans. 
Bilateral assistance by the U.S. to India was relatively low until about 
1958, accelerated sharply to a peak in about 1968, and then declined 
sharply, especially from about 1972, to the point of becoming insignifi 
cant. Given its large size (750 million population), aid levels to India, 
on a per capita basis, have been very low at their peak in 1965-66 
being $2.6 compared to $20 to $50 per capita in many African coun 
tries currently. Only about 12 percent of these expenditures was on 
agricultural projects, most of a small-scale nature. 1 This situation is 
in contrast to that of many African countries in several ways. First, 
in Africa not only is the overall level of aid much higher, but the 
dependence on food aid is very small in comparison with India's. Food 
aid constitutes only about 10 percent of total aid to Africa, compared 
to over 50 percent of U.S. assistance to India. Much of the aid is in 
the form of financial aid and also in the form of projects. In contrast, 
much of the U.S. assistance to India was in the form of commodity 
or program aid and only a small amount in project aid. Project aid in 
Africa has tended to tax the limited planning and implementation capacity 
of the countries, as the resources devoted to developing such capacity 
further have been relatively limited, unlike in India. Also, quite a signifi 
cant amount of technical assistance has been provided to help in the 
implementation of projects. It is estimated that close to $4 billion were 
committed by OECD countries in the form of technical assistance to 
Africa during the 1970s.
Relatively little of this technical assistance has been allocated to im 
proving domestic policy, planning and implementation capacity. Indeed, 
much of the "learning by doing" has involved the technical assistance 
staff and, due to their short tenures, there has been much loss of learn 
ing by doing. This is an especially serious problem given that African 
countries start from a poorer initial base of trained manpower and in 
stitutional development that did India. In India, only about 1,400 U.S. 
agricultural advisors are estimated to have resided on a long-term basis 
from 1952 to 1973, and never more than 150 advisors at any given point 
in time. Only about 3,200 Indians were trained in agricultural and natural
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resource issues during this period. These numbers do not seem large 
in relation to India's size and needs. Yet there is a general belief that 
the U.S. made an important contribution to India's agricultural 
development.
I argue in this paper that it is the quality and the form of assistance 
which was the basis of this contribution and it is the nature of the in 
teraction of aid with domestic agricultural and overall policy which ex 
plains the success. The contributions appear to be in the form of: 
(1) developing of indigenous human and institutional capacity for 
agricultural research, policy, planning and evaluation, and (2) input into 
the formation and implementation of an overall agricultural policy which 
would be conducive to growth. We will stress that the initiative for im 
proved policy and planning ultimately came from India. The successive 
droughts, increased dependence on foreign aid and external interference 
in domestic policy affairs from about 1958, when foreign aid accelerated, 
until about 1965 when it reached a crescendo for India to reform its 
agricultural policies and to put in place a package of internally consis 
tent reforms which would increase production led to this initiative. Good 
luck also played a part. Apart from India's obviously better institutional 
and trained manpower base, the existence of technologies it could im 
port as well as the institutional models for technology generation it could 
borrow and install at home made a difference to its prospects. Finally 
and of considerable importance, India had been experimenting with dif 
ferent policies since the early 1950s and there was much accumulated 
learning through this process; when the crisis arose in the mid-1960s, 
India was able to utilize this valuable learning experience. We will show 
that these preconditions are not enjoyed by Africa to the same extent.
Until about 1963, India pursued a growth strategy which stressed an 
import-substituting industrialization policy in which agriculture had a 
relatively small role. During the first three plan periods the proportion 
of investments going to the agricultural sector ranged between 6 per 
cent to 10 percent. India has been broadly criticized for keeping its 
agricultural prices low prior to 1967. 2 Our analysis indicates that In 
dian prices were well above world market prices for wheat between 
1957 to 1972, however, even when measured in real effective exchange
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rates (see Figure 3). Only in the case of rice were prices below interna 
tional prices prior to 1967.
Programs for the development of agriculture, however, tended to focus 
on community development and extension programs aimed at convinc 
ing farmers to adopt modern technology. But the most important factor 
to be emphasized is that the physical response of production to fertilizers 
was relatively low for the traditional varieties of wheat and rice (Desai 
had estimated fertilizer response coefficients of 12kg per 1kg of nutrient 
for irrigated wheat under local conditions, the equivalent coefficients 
being lOkgs for rice). It is noteworthy that despite the impressive an 
nual growth rate of nutrient use of 19.8 percent annually, the average 
annual rate of growth for foodgrain output was about 3 percent per year 
during this period and there were substantial year-to-year fluctuations 
in overall production that tended to be influenced largely by weather. 
Dependence on imports had increased to meet domestic food re 
quirements. Figure 1 shows the domestic availability of food grains in 
cluding the rising imports in the mid-1960s. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
relationship of domestic to international prices of rice and wheat in In 
dia and illustrate the less favorable treatment of rice in terms of inter 
national prices as well as relative to wheat. Figure 4 shows the growth 
of fertilizer use in India. While India's dependence on financial assistance 
had increased by 1958 as a result of a foreign exchange gap created 
by an ambitious second plan and aggravated by the persistent need for 
commercial food imports, by 1966 net food imports had grown to over 
10 million tons.
The role of price policy reform vis-a-vis other agricultural policies 
is worth considering in the context of India's agricultural growth since 
1967. President Johnson believed that India was not serious about an 
agricultural policy reform. Further support for India's development by 
the U.S. and the World Bank, which had begun to emerge as a major 
donor, was contingent on India's devaluating its currency as well as 
a package of policies for the agricultural sector including increased pro 
ducer prices for rice and wheat, increased imports of fertilizers and pro 
motion of their role for the private sector and concentration among the 
progressive farmers in high potential areas, and support of prices for
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the agricultural sector by a newly established food corporation of India 
becoming the buyer and seller of last resort. Many of these policies 
are similar to those now being advocated in African countries. It has 
generally been the U.S. belief that the imposition of these conditions 
on India in the mid-1960s as a prerequisite for receiving financial 
assistance from the U.S. and the World Bank, codified in the "Treaty 
of Rome" between the Indian minister of agriculture and the U.S. 
secretary of agriculture, had a profound impact on India's food situation.
Indeed, frequently the 1965 episode in India is cited in the context 
of the current discussion on policy reform in Africa, suggesting that 
achievement of the same policy reform in Africa, if necessary through 
the same type of conditionality, might solve Africa's problems.
There are, however, several important differences between the In 
dian and African cases which are worth highlighting. 3 First, much of 
the productivity growth in India occurred under irrigated conditions. 
In contrast, only 6 percent of the area under cultivation in Africa is 
irrigated. Not only was India's initial base of irrigated agriculture larger 
(18 percent of the area under cultivation being irrigated), but the new 
high-yielding technologies induced further investment in irrigation. Sec 
ond, the high-yielding rice and wheat varieties used in India were the 
result of major technological breakthroughs which had occurred in the 
international agricultural research institutes. In the case of wheat, this 
resulted in a Nobel Peace prize for its discoverer. Estimated response 
coefficients of high-yielding wheat under irrigated conditions are 20kgs 
per kg of nutrient, or 66 percent larger than under traditional varieties 
and of rice 15kgs, or 50 percent higher than traditional varieties.
Even then, the political decision to concentrate the use of fertilizer 
in limited areas of high potential was a difficult decision for the Indian 
government. I have documented elsewhere that there was internal op 
position to this approach from almost every important Indian lobby, 
including the intellectuals, the communists, the state governments, who 
would not gain from such concentration, the planning commission, 
because it would require increased foreign exchange, etc. Nevertheless, 






Domestic and International Price of Wheat
0 I——l-
Dom /reol-eff rote
Dom price, off rote 
Internotionol Price
Figure 4 
Growth of Fertilizer Use in India
Metric tons of nutrient (millions) 
10
60 Lele
Most important, with the assistance of the Rockefeller and Ford Foun 
dations and the U.S. government, India had been attempting to build 
up its agricultural research system starting as early as the late 1940s. 
The food crisis, however, provided the basis for pushing through dif 
ficult policy decisions with regard to the research system's reorganiza 
tion that had been stalled for nearly 20 years due to the internal resistance 
to reform. Therefore with the advent of the food crisis, India was able 
to put into operation an effective research system. This made the subse 
quent adjustments to continue to maintain its productivity gains possi 
ble. Such an adaptive research capability is particularly important in 
the case of crops which encounter highly diverse growing conditions 
and which therefore require a high degree of local adaptation. This was 
the case with regard to rice. The Indian research system was ultimately 
able to issue 221 varieties of rice to address the many diverse adoption 
problems faced in the promotion of new rice varieties.
Table 1 shows that irrigated wheat alone accounted for an astonishing 
99 percent of the increase in productivity during the 1968-69 to 1981-82 
period. Rice contributed another 15 percent. During the earlier 1956-57 
to 1968-69 period, wheat and rice had contributed 89 and 79 percent 
respectively to increased productivity. Because the contribution of other 
rainfed crops to the overall growth in production such as millet, sorghum, 
maize, etc., which are the dominant crops in Africa as well, was nil 
or negative (meaning the area under cultivation of these crops declined 
due to competition of higher productivity crops), the combined con 
tribution of wheat and rice accounted for over 100 percent of aggregate 
productivity growth. There was a complex input substitution with the 
new technology. In the rainfed areas, the new technology increased pro 
ductivity from irrigation more and the spread of minor irrigation, par 
ticularly from tubewells, was very rapid. Whereas tubewells accounted 
for only about 6 percent of irrigated area in 1960-61, they accounted 
for about 14 percent by 1970-71 and 20 percent in the mid-1970s. In 
the irrigated areas, use of fertilizer accelerated as the marginal produc 
tivity of fertilizer curve shifted upwards and flattened out at a much 
greater input level. But because use of fertilizer on rainfed areas grew 
slowly, total fertilizer use increased at an annual rate of about 12 per 
cent, slower than before. It is noteworthy that the foodgrain produc-
Table 1
Crop-Wise Contributions of Individual Effects to the Change 















































































































































































































































































( ) Indicates percent of the sum of the effects for the period.
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tion growth rate accelerated to 3.5 percent annually during 1965-66 to 
1976-77, despite the deceleration in fertilizer growth rate by over 40 
percent to 12 percent annually. This would suggest an improved effi 
ciency of fertilizer use brought about by two related factors: technical 
change in the form of the new grain varieties with higher fertilizer 
response coefficients and an acceleration in the rate of growth of ir 
rigation (table 2) induced by the enhanced profitability of the new 
varieties.
Table 2
Growth Rates for Foodgrain Production, Fertilizer Use 
and Irrigated Area
Foodgrains Fertilizer Irrigated area
Period

























SOURCES: "Area and Production of Principal Crops in India," Government of India; "Fer 
tilizer Statistics," The Fertilizer Association of India.
NOTES: Information on foodgrain production was available only through 1983-84. Information 
on irrigated area was availably only through 1981-82. "Annual" refers to a simple yearly series, 
while "3-yr. avg." refers to a three-year moving average series. Irrigated area rates use an an 
nual series.
Finally, since the U.S. was the only supplier of food and since its 
reserves were declining rapidly, India realized that, should a deficit arise, 
increased reliance on the U.S. for food imports was likely to be un 
wise, as it would result in increased world food prices given India's 
large food import requirements. It was also injurious to national pride, 
as it would compromise India's pursuit of an independent foreign policy 
because of the dependence on scarce U.S. stocks. Thus Indian 
policymakers were able to overcome a number of formidable domestic
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obstacles to reform, although the individuals involved in the reform paid 
a substantial cost. (Mr. Subramaniam, the minister of agriculture, for 
instance, lost the election in 1967 because of a perception that he had 
become too pro-American.)
The current discussion of macroeconomic and sectoral policy condi 
tionally tied to financial aid of donors in Africa, as well as the increas 
ed food imports, are reminiscent of India's situation for those involved 
in such assistance earlier. Nevertheless, many differences exist, although 
many African countries have devaluated, revised their food prices and 
liberalized fertilizer imports and distribution as did India. There have 
been relatively few technological breakthroughs in the case of crops 
grown in the semi-arid areas of either Africa or India, however. The 
exception is hybrid maize, which has shown impressive growth in many 
parts of Africa where similar effective services in the form of timely 
fertilizer supply, extension and output marketing facilities have been 
available. Some technological possibilities exist, but require effective 
adaptation of varieties and practices to local conditions such as that done 
by the Indian research system in the case of rice earlier. The national 
research systems of most African countries, with the exception of Zim 
babwe and Kenya, have not shown the capacity to organize adaptive 
research programs which would lead to the production of more suitable 
planting material.
Unlike in India, donors who have focused on project aid until recently 
have neglected the development of national research systems; contrary 
to much conventional wisdom on the subject, they have assumed that 
borrowing technology from the international research systems and con 
ducting on-farm adoptive research without building the national research 
system which will carry out effective on-station research will address 
the problem. They have therefore not invested in either the develop 
ment of national research systems or in the training of nationals on the 
scale necessary. Now that national research systems have been recogniz 
ed to be a critical bottleneck, however, all donors, who often have con 
flicting ideas as to what research to conduct and how, have begun to 
focus on the systems, creating much competition and confusion in the 
African countries, especially given the limited resources they can bring 
to bear.
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The implications of food surplus in the world must also be considered 
here in their effect on motivation to address policy problems in Africa. 
Food aid is relatively easily available to African governments, whose 
food import requirements are small. Therefore, they have not yet at 
tached the degree of priority to the long-run development of their own 
science and technology capacity and to the improvement of their 
agricultural delivery systems to experience sustained growth in produc 
tion and productivity. Although some are experimenting with policy 
reform, attempts at policy reform are by themselves unlikely to solve 
the problem. Even in encouraging policy reform, however, the donors 
have not yet begun to program their assistance to create the long-run 
policy planning capacity in African governments. Such emphasis on 
capacity building is needed, given the fact that African countries start 
with a poorer initial base.
The contrast between India and Africa shows that the nature and the 
severity of external shocks can make a difference in the extent to which 
policy makers in developing countries are willing to undertake reform. 
In India's case, however, both good planning and good luck played a 
much more important role than is generally acknowledged. India's own 
trained manpower and domestic economic planning ability could be 
harnessed in a period of crisis. The small number of donors helping 
India placed emphasis on strengthening India's policy making, implemen 
tation and technological capacity.
These comparisons reinforce the point frequently made in the case 
of African agriculture, namely, that the sources of stagnation of rain- 
fed agriculture are quite complex and will require a much longer time 
horizon to overcome. They will require a much more sustained effort 
than either donors or African governments are yet fully ready to 
undertake.
NOTES
1. These data are assembled in Arthur A. Goldsmith, "American Foreign Assistance and 
Agricultural Development in India," background paper prepared for the World Bank Develop 
ment Strategy Division, 1985.
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2. See Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development. Cam 
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1977; T. W. Schultz, Development and Change in Traditional 
Agriculture: Focus on South Asia. East Lansing:Asian Studies Center, Michigan State Universi 
ty, 1968; and Paul Streeter and Michael Lipton, eds., Crisis of Indian Planning. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968.
3. The discussion in the succeeding paragraphs draws from Uma Lele and Arthur A. Goldsmith, 
Building Agricultural Research Capacity: India's Experience with the Rockefeller Foundation and 
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United States agriculture is in a global context. On the order of half 
the farm land in the United States is used to produce for export. Without 
overseas markets, the amount of adjustment American agriculture would 
require to bring domestic supply and demand into balance is almost im 
possible to conceive. That adjustment would involve the movement out 
of agriculture of about half of the resources of American agricultural 
production. If comparative advantage was at work without overseas 
markets, the bulk of farmers would leave agriculture and well over half 
of all the land which is now in agriculture would convert to other uses. 
American farmers must think in a global context, must recognize that 
their future depends on export markets and must recognize where those 
export markets are. This hardly seemed a problem a decade ago, but 
it is very much a problem now.
Before I proceed, I would like to state a simple message and a broad 
thought. We should all be thankful for the bountiful harvests occur 
ring in much of the world. We should be concerned that if we are com 
placent about those harvests, they will diminish in the future. We should 
be apprehensive that the extreme complexity of the task of using these 
bountiful harvests to banish hunger and to bring prosperity to those who 
produce them will turn us away from the policies needed to sustain and 
use that abundance.
I am grateful to Leonardo Paulino and J.S. Sarma for stimulating interaction on these important 
issues, David Chesser for developing much of the data, and especially to Tom Harrington for 




Today there appears to be an abundance and even a glut of food. In 
sharp contrast, a little more than a decade ago the World Food Con 
ference was called to recommend immediate action to deal with scarci 
ty and even famine in Asia and Africa. Global cereal stocks in the 
mid-1980s have been more than twice as large as in the mid-1970s. 
Real world cereal prices in 1985 were 30 percent lower than in 1981, 
compared to an almost twofold increase from 1972 to 1974. Real fer 
tilizer prices have fallen to equal the lows of the late 1960s, after hav 
ing more than quadrupled in real terms from 1971 to 1974. A lack of 
natural feedstock is now much less worrying than inadequate invest 
ment in fertilizer production. The focus of food shortage has switched 
from Asia to Africa.
In the early 1970s, not only was food scarce, but so were the inputs 
for producing it. If a low-income country had a crop failure, it was 
difficult for them to command the foreign exchange to import necessary 
food, food aid was greately diminished, and it was difficult to purchase 
fertilizer on the open market even if the countries had the necessary 
financial resources. That was an extremely difficult time for all food 
deficit countries and particularly the low-income ones.
Finally, many developing countries were diverted from long-term 
development efforts by overwhelming debt problems and the need for 
major adjustments in foreign exchange rates and their national budgets.'
In comparing the 1980s with the 1970s, it is worth making note of 
the switch in emphasis of food problems from Asia to Africa. In Asia 
in the late 1960s famine was widespread and the scarcity of food was 
acute. People like the Paddock brothers, in Famine 1975, were writing 
in favor of triage. The Paddock brothers argued that the food situation 
was so hopeless in Asia that close to a billion people should be written 
off as having no hope for survival. Although that idea was foolish even 
then, it is well to note how bad the situation looked at that time. Africa, 
however, seemed to be a continent abundant with land and with ample 
supplies of food.
The Green Revolution in Asia accelerated the rate of growth of 
food production considerably in the late 1960s and the 1970s. That,
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combined with the generally more favorable food situation in the world 
and growing incomes in many Asian countries which allow them to 
increase food imports when in need has switched the world food prob 
lem away from Asia. In Africa, however, per capita food production 
has been declining rapidly for a decade or two. Per capita consumption 
has also fallen. That has occurred in the midst of a miserable economic 
performance in most African countries that has resulted in acute food 
scarcity even in the face of the present global abundance.
Underlying Trends
Food production and consumption data for many developing coun 
tries are notoriously poor. Thus in examining the data and drawing con 
clusions about past trends and certainly for extrapolations into the future, 
one must be cautious. For some commodities, such as cassava in Africa, 
different sources show trends going in opposite directions, not just dif 
ferences in magnitude. Thus we will be particularly careful with the 
root crop data, and we will be careful to deal only with large aggregates, 
which, one can hope, average out discrepancies in the data.
It is also worth adding that analysis of these trends is useful for get 
ting an indication of the forces affecting supply and demand. Given that 
these-forces tend to be stable and powerful, it gives us a basis for look 
ing into the future. Despite the statistical difficulties, the policy con 
clusions which follow from the analysis are significant. They, of course, 
may lead inexorably to policy actions unacceptable to important interest 
groups. Thus, even analysis of past trends becomes a controversial mat 
ter. The facts of the global food situation are as contentious as the 
extrapolations.
As we discuss these underlying trends, we will see that the dynamic 
global food supply/demand balance links the interests of developed and 
developing countries and has important implications for foreign 
assistance, agricultural research policy, and the domestic agricultural 
policy of the United States.
For the period 1961-80, developing countries' cereal production grew 
at an annual rate of 2.9 percent per year; consumption grew at the
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considerably faster rate of 3.2 percent per year (table I). 2 Hence, net 
annual cereal imports of the developing countries increased more than 
fourfold in 20 years from about 15 million tons to 64 million tons. 3 
These data exclude the People's Republic of China because the extreme 
variability of production caused by major political events associated with 
the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution" grossly 
distorts trends that include these periods.
Table 1
Trend Annual Growth Rates of Cereal Consumption
and Production for Developing and Developed Countries
1961-80 and 1961-83
  , 1961-80 1961-83 
Country _________________________________
group Consumption Production Consumption Production
Developing 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.5
(excluding China) (3.2) (2.9) (3.3) (2.9)
Developed 2.5 3.1 2.2 2.8
SOURCE: FAO, "Production Yearbook Tape, 1984," and "Agricultural Supply Utilization Ac 
counts Tapes, 1984" (Rome 1985).
Cereal imports to developing countries grew slowly in the 1960s and 
then accelerated sharply after 1972, with that accelerated growth showing 
no sign of decline through 1984 (table 2). 4 Developing countries in 
creased their share of total world imports of cereals from a 1961-63 
average of 36 percent to a 1981-83 average of 43 percent an absolute 
increase of 315 percent (table 3). The developing countries represent 
the only cereal market capable of rapid growth.
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SOURCE: FAO, "Agncultural Supply Utilization Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome 1985).
From 1961 to 1980, cereal production in the developed countries grew 
3.1 percent per year. Consumption grew at a much slower pace, 2.5 
percent per year, with the difference representing a rapidly growing 
exportable surplus. 5 Developed country imports and exports dropped 
sharply from 1981 to 1984, with a substantial recovery in 1985. 6
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The Future: Projections to 2000
Projections of past trends for food supply and demand, though an 
uncertain indicator of the future, have three features that recommend 
them: they smooth the effects of short-term influences such as weather; 
they illuminate the effects of cumulative forces; and they show poten 
tial changes in a country's position from net importer to net exporter 
and vice versa, arising from given supply and demand changes. Such 
projections are particularly revealing for food, for which underlying 
structural forces of supply and demand only change slowly.
A standard projection from 1980 to 2000 for developing countries, 
assuming that trends in output and income from the 1960s to 1980s con 
tinue, shows an increase in the shortfall (or imports) of staple food crops 
of 40 million tons. Actual net imports in 1984 were on the projected 
trend line. 7
Growth in the demand for livestock products is an important source 
of growth in the demand for basic food staples. While in developing 
countries waste and by-products initially sustain livestock production, 
accelerated growth of livestock output quickly surpasses the inelastic 
supply of such feed. Further increments to production are made large 
ly on concentrate feeds, particularly cereals. The projections cited above 
assume constant feeding rates in livestock production.
If, however, we project the trend growth of feed use during the base 
period and further assume market relationships for livestock products 
at constant relative prices, the production shortfall in developing coun 
tries increases by another 40 million tons. 8 It must be emphasized that 
this projection of feed use requires a return to the per capita income 
growth of the 1966-80 period. The debt and structural adjustment crises 
must be met and passed beyond.
Developing countries have been expanding livestock product imports 
rapidly. Since livestock production is generally labor intensive, it is 
logical for developing countries to displace projected imports with 
domestic production. Success in such an effort would, conservatively, 
add another 40 million tons to food crop imports.
These favorable circumstances in essence mean that developing coun 
tries would improve their development strategy and return to the growth
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rates of the 1960s and 1970s. If they did this, developing country im 
ports would grow at a rate similar to or higher than in the past two 
decades.
Three caveats must be noted about such projections. First, one must 
take these numbers in aggregated form and not look at individual coun 
tries. That is because so many of the unpredictable events in the world 
benefit some countries and not others. For example, in the 1970s growth 
in most of the oil-producing countries surged ahead, it is said, at the 
expense of many oil-importing developing countries; perhaps the reverse 
will happen in the 1990s. Countries differ in their natural resource 
bases:Argentina and Thailand have very different ratios of people to 
agricultural production resources from Taiwan or Bangladesh. On all 
these matters, grouping countries helps us see central tendencies at 
times we do want to see the forest and not the trees.
Second, and very important, when we look at food gaps and trade 
figures, we are looking at small residuals from large estimates of con 
sumption and production small differences in production and consump 
tion data give large differences in "trade." It is rash indeed to predict 
trade volumes and their effects on global prices.
Third, we are poorly placed to judge the effects of pure science 
breakthroughs in biology on agricultural production. Keep in mind that 
while such breakthroughs add to demand as well as supply in develop 
ing countries, they add only to supply in developed countries.
Theory
Before drawing conclusions, it is useful to briefly outline the theory 
that lies behind the trends and relationships just presented, a theory that 
gives credibility to such projections. I abstract grossly for brevity. 9
In developed countries, food demand is virtually satiated and hence 
does not increase with income. In contrast, food output grows con 
tinuously through research and various complementary institutions. 
Without export growth, the benefit of technological change can only 
be realized by undertaking the socially difficult task of rapidly withdraw 
ing resources (land and people) from agriculture.
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In sharp contrast, in developing countries, the rising incomes of low- 
income people, derived from employment growth, are converted by 
remarkably high demand elasticities into effective demand for food 60 
to 80 percent of incremental incomes are so spent. Thus in developing 
countries, increased food supplies and increased employment are two 
sides of the same coin; one cannot proceed long without the other.
Furthermore, accelerated growth of food production can set in mo 
tion powerful multiplier forces on the growth of income and, especial 
ly, employment in other sectors. That, coupled with growth arising 
autonomously in the other sectors, results in the picture of fast growth 
in basic food staples production accompanied by even faster growth 
in consumption.
These relationships make reasonable the remarkable finding that from 
the early 1960s to the late 1970s, the 29 developing countries with the 
fastest growth rates in basic food staple production increased their im 
ports of basic food staples by 360 percent in the same period. 10 This 
potential for developing countries to expand demand for food faster than 
even high rates of growth of food production needs to be understood 
and nurtured. It offers exciting prospects for the reduction of poverty 
and malnourishment.
Implications: Developed Countries
The credibility of projections for developed countries is reduced by 
the large year-to-year fluctuations in food production. However, a simple 
projection to the year 2000 of domestic use and production for the period 
1961-80 shows an exportable surplus from developed countries more 
than double the largest projection for developing country net imports. n 
These estimates assume no diminution of growth rates for livestock feed 
inthe Soviet Bloc from the high rates of 1961-80. Such estimates con 
firm the need for a large reduction in developed country agricultural 
production.
These estimates are extraordinarily fragile. If, for example, the pro 
duction growth rate in developed countries were to drop to equal rate 
of 1972-83 and consumption growth rates were maintained, then the
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developed countries would actually become net importers. 12 Unfortunate 
ly, while prediction of developed country exports is highly uncertain, 
it matters immensely to the choice of development strategy in develop 
ing countries.
Since the production trends in developed countries are very much 
subject to policy, it is well to keep in mind the following points.
First, developing countries as a group will prosper more if they do 
not face rapidly rising food prices driven by their own demand. Con 
versely, they will be harmed by intermittent dumping on international 
markets and the consequent unpredictable periods of sharply depress 
ed prices.
Second, demand is much more responsive to price in developing coun 
tries than in developed countries, while supply is more responsive in 
developed countries than developing countries. Thus, rising global food 
prices foster surpluses in developed countries and reduce demand in 
developing countries, primarily through effects on the poor.
Third, however, the pace at which export surpluses are generated 
in developed countries now appears to be rapid enough to depress in 
ternational prices severely, suggesting a need for stuctural adjustments 
in developed countries despite the rapidly growing Third World market.
Fourth, given the social costs in developed countries of drastically 
reduced food production and the potential to raise food demand in 
developing countries through food aid-based employment growth, it is 
logical to develop such programs on a much larger scale than at present.
Implications: Developing Country Exporters
There are now few developing country net exporters of cereals. Two 
countries, Argentina and Thailand, with their favorable land-to-person 
ratios, accounted for 68 percent of total developing country cereal ex 
ports in 1979-83 and will export considerably larger amounts by 2000. 13 
There are probably one or two other developing countries with similar 
land resources and export potential but with unfavorable policies that 
hold back their agricultural potentials. These few countries are severe 
ly injured by food dumping by high-income countries.
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It is important for American farmers to recognize that while their 
markets lie in developing countries, there are very few developing coun 
tries that have a potential to be major exporters. They have in the past 
supplied about a quarter of the increment to developing country com 
mercial food imports; three-quarters has been left for the developed 
countries, including the United States.
In sharp contrast to Thailand and Argentina, the bulk of the coun 
tries projected to export food in the future are poor countries with high- 
population pressure. That is a quite different story.
In projections to 2000, countries with per capita incomes less than 
$500, strikingly, provide 83 percent of developing country net exports 
of major staple foods other than those of Thailand and Argentina. In 
particular, four countries China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan- 
account for 71 percent of projected developing country net exports, ex 
cluding Argentina and Thailand (table 4). 14
Table 4
Relative Shares of Projected Developing Country Net Production Surpluses 
by Level of Per Capita GNP (1980), 2000
Projected net surplus 
countries by level of - 






























SOURCE: Data set used in preparing IFPRI Research Report 52, Food Trends in the Third World: 
Past Trends and Projections to 2000. Projections based on FAO "Production" and "Agricultural 
Supply Utilization Accounts" tapes according to methodology described in Appendix 1 of Research 
Report.
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Exports of food clearly represent a failure in employment generation 
and poverty alleviation for countries with per capita incomes less than 
$500. Half or more of their populations are deficient in food intake. 
The countries in the low-income group projected to become exporters 
tend to be large and populous, to have a substantial percentage of their 
total GNP in nonagricultural sectors, but a large percentage of total labor 
force in agriculture the former typically twice the latter. 15 Their low 
per capita GNPs are, in general, increasing slowly. These characteristics 
suggest that they have capital-intensive investment policies causing low 
growth in employment, to the detriment of their low-income people. 
A change in investment strategy would foster faster and more equitable 
growth, accelerate the food production growth rate and change these 
countries from food exporters to food importers.
We now see an interesting question. Is the tendency of some low- 
income countries with large, hungry populations to export a result of 
bad policy or is it a passing structural problem? One could argue that 
since the problem is concentrated in the under $500 per capita income 
countries, and seems to resolve itself when income exceeds that level, 
that we should just wait. But there are difficulties in getting a country 
well enough organized so that the small and medium scale service and 
manufacturing sectors, which are so employment intensive, can expand 
rapidly. The argument would run that as the development process pro 
ceeds, the infrastructure is built, the trained personnel are developed, 
and the institutional structures necessary for rapid growth in employ 
ment are created. The lower-income countries simply have not yet finish 
ed these complex tasks, but they will.
Alternatively, one might argue that countries such as Indonesia, In 
dia, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China, the principal coun 
tries in this category projected to have large exports despite widespread 
hunger, have simply followed wrong development policies, that they 
have concentrated their capital on a few, large-scale, highly capital- 
intensive industries that create little employment. This leaves little capital 
to spread over most of their population, meaning that activities that are 
employment-intensive are starved for capital. In this argument, a change 
in the policies these countries have for prices, the allocation of capital,
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and public sector investment would bring about much more rapid growth 
in employment and the demand for food. Those countries would then 
cease to be exporters and would move on to the import market as do 
so many other developing countries with a similar economic situation. 
I will return to this issue later under the question of policy for foreign 
assistance and for American agriculture.
Implications: Developing Country Importers
It is notable that, virtually without exception, developing countries 
with per capita incomes greater than $500 are able to generate demand 
for food more rapidly than domestic production growth. Developing 
country importers with per capita incomes less than $500 also manage 
to increase employment and hence effective demand more rapidly than 
production. Of course the least developed countries with the lowest in 
comes simply have low growth rates in food production. They are able 
to use foreign assistance and food aid to keep consumption somewhat 
higher than would otherwise be possible.
The number one policy need for net food importing countries is an 
international environment in which food supplies are reliable. If they 
are to expand employment more rapidly than food production, they must 
believe, first, that the shortfalls generated by these divergent trends can 
be met without steadily rising prices. That means there must be a reliable 
international market. Second, and perhaps even more important, they 
need to be protected from radical fluctuations in domestic and interna 
tional supplies. For the latter, one needs a source of international finance 
such as a well-operating International Monetary Fund cereal facility. 
Whether enlarged stocks are needed as well is a moot point.
In order for employment growth to increase demand for food more 
rapidly than domestic supply, there must be wide participation in the 
development process. This, in turn, requires a rural infrastructure that 
brings most people into close contact with the improved markets and 
technology necessary for the modernization of agriculture. There is also 
a need for the development of employment linkages between agriculture
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and the rest of the economy so that growing agricultural incomes will 
produce expenditure patterns and responses to those patterns favorable 
to the growth of rural industry and employment. Agricultural growth 
through cost-decreasing technological change is the basic engine for 
such growth.
A Note on Foreign Assistance Policy
Foreign assistance policies that support a strategy of growth oriented 
toward increasing agricultural production and employment are favorable 
both to growth and to poverty alleviation in developing countries and 
to increased markets for food exporters. What are the broad policy 
outlines of such a strategy?
First and foremost is investment in agricultural research and its supprt 
services to start the engine of growth. Agriculture is a difficult sector 
to move because of the constraints on the land area. Thus the growth 
of agricultural production is subject to rapidly diminishing returns and 
hence increasing cost unless agricultural research is performed, as has 
been so dramatically successful in the United States, effectively so as 
to come up with new technologies that increase yields per acre. Those 
same technologies, which are essential in land-limited Asia, also raise 
labor productivity under the conditions in Africa where labor produc 
tivity is a more serious problem than land productivity.
Second is assistance to growth of infrastructure to ensure breadth of 
participation in growth. In a world of food surpluses, hungry people, 
and inadequate rural employment, investment in infrastructure offers 
immense potential for the effective use of food aid, particularly in the 
low-income countries. It is puzzling that hunger and lack of labor for 
building infrastructure, can coexist with huge food surpluses.
Third is increasing food security nationally and internationally. That 
is needed because a strategy relying on food and employment growth 
is terribly vulnerable to the effects of normal fluctuations in food 
production.
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Behind all these processes is a rapid expansion of trained people a 
high-employment strategy of growth is accompanied by extraordinari 
ly rapid growth in demand for educated people at all levels. Foreign 
assistance is most effective when helping meet that demand.
Agricultural Research Policy
.1 want to comment specifically on agricultural research policy for 
developing countries in the current global food context because of the 
central role of research to agricultural progress. The onset of the Green 
Revolution in Asia was very much a product of American foreign 
assistance, in part from the foundations, particularly the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Ford Foundation, and in part from U.S. govern 
ment foreign assistance. Assistance to agricultural research develop 
ment in Asia, and now in Africa, continues to be an important element 
of foreign assistance.
At the same time that agricultural research forms such an important 
element of foreign assistance, we find farmers in the United States who 
are concerned at loss of export markets, wondering whether helping 
developing countries to do agricultural research that brings about in 
creased production is going to provide competition in the domestic 
markets of those countries and even from exports. As we can see from 
a few countries such as Argentina and Thailand, and looking into the 
future, even more from some of the poorer countries, that is a legitimate 
concern. I have tried to emphasize how foreign assistance may be con 
structive in helping demand to increase more rapidly than the supply 
of food in the low-income countries characterized by great poverty, shor 
tage of food, and malnutrition.
The new environment of apparent global abundance of food brings 
somewhat differing requirements for food production research.
First, there must be an even greater emphasis than in the past on reduc 
ing the costs of production and hence raising incomes. In Asia, cost 
reductions occur by raising yields per acre. In Africa, the problem is
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more complex. Labor productivity is the greatest limitation to produc 
tion in Africa. We can already substantiate that, in general, the ap 
propriate way to raise labor productivity in Africa is through yield- 
increasing technology.
In Asia, since the International Rice Research Institute's pioneering 
work, which generated the variety IR8, we have not seen a major in 
crease in rice yield potential or reduction in the cost of producing rise. 
In fact, the real cost of production has been slowly rising over the past 
decade. Recent efforts have been dedicated largely to maintaining 
the yields produced by IR8 and widening the benefits of such varieties 
by increasing their adaptability and improving their resistance to diseases 
and pests. In this context, one can truly talk about saturation of the rice 
area with these high-yielding varieties. How will the growth rates of 
the recent past be maintained into the next decade or so? That is a serious 
problem in Asia. Our impression of food abundance will disappear within 
a decade or two without another research breakthrough.
Second, with a more bountiful food supply in the world, we have 
the opportunity to take more meaningful steps towards sustainable growth 
in agriculture. On the one hand, we must increasingly shift higher- 
yielding, more productive farming systems into environments whose 
ecosystems can sustain such increased intensity. That should allow a 
gradual increase in the proportion of population in areas more able to 
sustain it, while reducing population pressures in areas that cannot sus 
tain arable agriculture. We must ask ourselves what the implications 
are of this to two related research questions: (1) Under what cir 
cumstances and by what mechanisms can we use the increased abun 
dance of food in the world to reduce population pressures more rapidly 
in areas that cannot support arable agriculture? (2) Should that then push 
our research resources more towards the perennial grasses and tree crops 
that can be sustained in such areas?
Third, when the abundance of food increases, we must maximize the 
linkages between agricultural growth and employment growth in 
nonagricultural sectors. That too requires research. Increasingly, lack 
of effective demand for food is proving to be a constraint for develop 
ing countries with per capita incomes less than $500, in spite of
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progress in agricultural production. We have done a good job of 
documenting the existence of linkages between agricultural growth and 
employment in other sectors, but we have not gone far in producing 
the policy prescriptions for maximizing the size of those linkages.
Fourth, where food is more abundant, we can turn more vigorously 
to increasing employment by developing smallholder livestock produc 
tion. Here we face elastic demand for the product and hence a substan 
tial increase in demand from a small decline in prices. There are, 
however, clear technical problems, not only in production but also 
in marketing. Because of the inelasticity of waste and by-product feed 
supplies, research must have a twofold emphasis on increasing the 
productivity of grasslands and improving our knowledge about the pro 
ductive use of concentrate feeds. Any enhancement of livestock pro 
duction will also help to solve the difficult problem of inferior grains, 
such as millets and sorghums, and even maize. They are well-suited 
to large areas and there are good possibilities for increasing their yields. 
Yet the demand for them is highly inelastic except as livestock feed.
Fifth, with an increasing abundance of food, we need to focus our 
attention more on the problems of the poorest countries and the poorest 
people within those countries. However, these two sets of problems 
call for different treatment.
There undoubtedly needs to be an emphasis on the better areas within 
the poorest countries in order to increase the returns to investment in 
agriculture and to generate the funds for tackling the much more dif 
ficult problems of the more backward areas.
We must differentiate clearly between short-term needs to mitigate 
the problems of the poorest people in the poorest regions, and longer- 
term adjustments that can be made as population densities in those areas 
are gradually reduced through more intensive and sustainable develop 
ment elsewhere.
Conclusion
Two things seem clear from the foregoing analysis, the first somewhat 
more than the second. The future of American agriculture lies with the
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development of developing countries. They must raise their incomes, 
not just generally but among the lower-income half of their population 
specifically, so that those people have the purchasing power to increase 
their expenditures on food and to improve their diets. Thus it is in the 
interest of American agriculture to see development move quickly in 
developing countries. Because those countries are largely agricultural, 
that can only happen by developing their agriculture. Because they have 
either a shortage of land or extremely low labor productivity, incomes 
in agriculture can only be increased through research-based technological 
advance. Thus we find the anomalous situation that it is good for 
American agriculture to vigorously support agricultural research in 
developing countries so that they can increase the productivity of their 
agriculture. That proves not to be an anomaly because, as incomes in 
those countries rise, people spend a high percentage of their increased 
income on food. That is in sharp contrast to the developed countries 
where rising incomes of even quite low-income people essentially do 
not increase demand for food.
The second conclusion is that, at their rate of growth of food pro 
duction over the last two decades, the developed countries will pro 
duce far more than is necessary to meet the import needs of developing 
countries. Thus there will undoubtedly have to be structural adjustment 
in the agricultures of the developed countries. This is not just the United 
States and Canada, but also Western Europe. That structural adjust 
ment need not necessarily come from reduced prices, but our experience 
is that without lower prices the fiscal cost to governments is far more 
than they are willing to bear for long, although one cannot help but 
note that the willingness to bear high fiscal costs to support agriculture 
seems to be quite great. In both Western Europe and the United States, 
we are shouldering subsidies to agriculture that are multiples of what 
was thought the largest possible a decade or so ago.
If we put the first point and the second point together, we have a caveat: 
that if we expect developing countries to emphasize both increasing their 
demand for food and increasing production of food in their countries, 
we are asking them to throw themselves open to the vagaries of weather 
to a much larger extent than with alternative strategies. If they are to 
do that, they will want to believe and will want to know that food security
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is assured to them. That can be done through the financing facilities 
of the International Monetary Fund so that poor people in poor coun 
tries can bid food away from livestock during periods of scarcity. It 
also means that the developed countries, while making adjustments to 
their agricultures, must be careful not to go too far and bring back the 
food scarcities of the 1970s.
Let us hope that the present abundance of food is not an illusion or 
a quickly passing aberration. Let us recognize abundance for the bless 
ing it is. Let us respond by raising incomes in developing countries with 
new, cost-effective food production technology; by using food surpluses 
to back labor-intensive investment in the infrastructure that so broadens 
participation in growth; by providing food security measures that reduce 
the risks governments face; by caring about poverty and acting to reduce 
it; and most important, by learning now how to bring the lower-income 
countries to the stage of development where effective demand for food 
outruns effective agricultural development policies.
NOTES
1. As cited in "Commentary: The Changing Global Food Scene Opportunities for Development 
and Poverty Alleviation," IFPRIReport, Vol. 8 (3) (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy 
Research Institute, October 1986).
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and "Agricultural Supply Utilization Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome: FAO, 1985).
3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Agricultural Supply Utilization 
Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome: FAO, 1985). "Developing Countries" includes China, the twenty- 
year penod referring to 1961-65 to 1979-83 averages of net annual cereal imports.
4. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Agricultural Supply Utilization 
Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome: FAO, 1985). The annual growth rate of cereal imports to developing 
countries changed from 3.0 percent (1961-72) to 8.1 percent (1972-83).
5. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Production Yearbook Tape, 1984" 
and "Agricultural Supply Utilization Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome: FAO, 1985).
6. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Agricultural Supply Utilization 
Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome: FAO, 1985).
7. As cited in L.A. Paulino, Food in the Third World: Past Trends and Projections to 2000, Research 
Report 52 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1986), Table 12, 
p. 42. The projection excludes China, and assumes trend growth in production (1961-80) and 
consumption (based on per capita income growth trends 1966-80 and FAO elasticities for food 
and meat consumption).
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8. Paulino, Food in the Third World, Table 15, p. 62.
9. This argument is developed fully in John W. Mellor and B.F. Johnston, "The World Food 
Equation: Interrelations Among Development, Employment, and Food Consumption," Journal 
of Economic Literature, 22 (June 1984).
10. Twenty-nine rapid agricultural growth developing countries increased their food imports from 
2.37 (1966-70) to 8.57 (1976-80) million metric tons, an increase of almost fourfold.
11. Projections were done for developed countries as a group and compared production and total 
domestic use by a methodology similar to but simpler than that of Paulino i.e., based on not 
income elasticities of demand but trend comsumption patterns. Feed was projected on a trend; 
food was projected to remain constant at 1966-80 per capita consumption levels times the ex 
pected increased population.
Different base years chosen for production yielded varied outcomes, ranging from a high net 
surplus of production of 400 million metric tons (1961-80) production trend to a low net deficit 
of production of 57 million metric tons (1972-83) production trend. When developed countries 
were projected by regional groupings, the net surplus was 136 million metric tons, reflecting a 
high rate of feed consumption in Eastern European countries.
12. See footnote 11.
13. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Production Yearbook Tape, 1984," 
and "Agricultural Supply Utilization Accounts Tape, 1984;; (Rome: FAO, 1985), and projec 
tions in Paulino, Research Report 52. Argentina is a net exporter of 17 million metric tons and 
Thailand of 6 million metric tons (1979-83 averages), and they are projected to have net surpluses 
of 26 and 30 million metric tons respectively, in 2000, or 50 percent of the total projected net surplus.
14. From data set on individual countries used in Paulina, Food in the Third World. Assumptions 
of projections are the same as described in footnote 7.
15. Data from World Bank, World Tables, Volumes 1 and 2 (1983).
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C. Peter Timmer 
Harvard University
A major policy confrontation is brewing over United States technical 
assistance to agricultural development efforts in developing countries. 
The longer U.S. farming remains in a financial depression due to com 
petitive pressures on its agricultural exports, the more vehement is the 
criticism that U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid to developing coun 
tries, especially to their agricultural sectors, is stabbing American farmers 
inthe back. Directors of international agricultural programs in the na 
tion's land grant universities feel this heat most directly, as their budgets 
are subject to review by state legislatures. Most of the faculty involved 
in these programs also have speaking and extension responsibilities that 
put them in day-to-day contact with farmers. United States Department 
of Agriculture and USAID officials are grilled on this topic during their 
testimony to Congress.
The response to these pressures has been a careful and documented 
appeal to the empirical record based on a growing volume of academic 
analysis of the relationship between agricultural growth in developing 
countries and trends in agricultural imports, especially from the United 
States. There now seems to be a rough consensus in the agricultural 
development profession that a positive connection exists between these 
two dimensions of the development process. The best summary of this 
view is from Earl Kellogg, an agricultural economist who serves as 
associate director of the International Agriculture Program for the 
University of Dlinois, in a state that feels very keenly the competitive 
pressures on exports:
Developing countries continue to be the best potential growth 
markets for U.S. agricultural exports. To realize this poten-
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tial, they must achieve economic growth that results in in 
creased per capita incomes and foreign exchange availabili 
ty. Because of the size and economic importance of the 
agricultural sector in developing countries, it must contribute 
to this economic growth. In addition, developing countries 
must be able to export products in which they have a com 
parative advantage. To accomplish this growth in income and 
exports will require that developing countries obtain capital 
and technical assistance for agriculture and other economic 
sectors. If growth and development are achieved, develop 
ing countries can continue to be important customers for U.S. 
agricultural exports.
For a number of reasons, then, improving agricultural and 
food production in developing countries is important to U.S. 
interests. These efforts benefit people living in poverty, im 
prove the chances for world peace and stability and also con 
tribute to the long-term prosperity of American agriculture. l
Most of us in the economic development profession hope that this 
view that development assistance benefits both recipient and donor is 
true. The historical record is reassuring. A study of the 1961 to 1976 
period by Bachman and Paulino for the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) noted a positive relationship between 
agricultural production and staple food imports.
The data suggest that staple food exporters have little cause 
to worry about the rapid growth of food production in the 
developing countries. Staple food imports in the rapid-growth 
countries increased much faster than exports, and, conse 
quently, net imports continued to grow. Although the in 
creases in food production in the study countries are im 
pressive, it is evident that in most of these countries food 
production growth rates need to be maintained or further 
augmented to meet the increasing demand for staple foods. 
The expansion of both staple food exports and imports 
reflects on one hand the increased production capacity in par 
ticular crops in these countries and, on the other, the rapid 
ly increasing demand generated by population growth and 
rising income levels. Income-induced increases in demand 
appear to arise from the growing demands for a greater varie 
ty of foods as consumption patterns change. Data from a 
number of rapid-growth countries indicate that part of the
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increased demand for staple foods arose from the expanding 
use of staple foods for conversion into livestock and poultry 
products. 2
Kellogg cites analysis carried out at USDA that also supports this 
hypothesis. 3 Lee and Shane present Malaysia as an example of a coun 
try that is becoming a consistent and growing importer of U.S. 
agricultural commodities, especially feedstuffs, while rapidly developing 
both domestic and export-oriented agriculture. 4 A masters thesis at the 
University of Illinois conducted statistical analysis of 77 countries and 
found that in "no estimated equation were results obtained that show 
ed a negative coefficient significantly different from zero for the cor 
relation between per capita agricultural production in developing coun 
tries and their per capita imports of agricultural products." 5 Case study 
analysis of Brazil and South Korea as rapidly-growing countries and 
of Sierra Leone as a slowly-growing country further substantiated these 
statistical results. 6
Thomas Morrison of the IMF Research Department has investigated 
the long-term and short-term factors affecting cereal imports in 1979/80. 
On the basis of a regression model for 48 countries which incorporated 
such long-run factors as GNP per capita, population density on arable 
land, average annual cereals production per capita (for the years 
1977-79), and share of population living in urban areas, as well as short- 
run factors such as cereal production in 1979 as a percentage of the 
average, food aid (cereals) per capita, and gross international reserves 
available at the end of January 1979, relative to the average for the 
1977-78 period, Morrison concluded as follows:
Of the long-term determinants, level of economic develop 
ment is the most significant in explaining cereal imports. The 
coefficient ... is positive and significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
that level of economic development, through its relation to 
consumption demand . . . positively influences per capita 
cereal imports. The urbanization variable . . . without the 
GNP variable, has the expected positive coefficient, but the 
coefficient is not significant.
Of the variables indicating domestic production capacity, 
only population density is significant. The coefficient is
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positive and significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. . . . This variable, indicating population pressure on 
arable land, is the most reliable variable representing total 
domestic food production capacity.
Cereal production per capita [average] has the expected 
negative coefficient, but is not significant. One reason why 
the coefficient is not significant is probably . . . that in many 
countries non-cereal crops represent significant shares of total 
food production.
. . . The regression equations explained between 41 and 
82 percent of the variation in per capita cereal imports across 
countries. Since government policies can have a significant 
influence on the level of cereal imports regardless of coun 
try characteristics and circumstances, one cannot expect such 
regression equations to have greater explanatory power. The 
fact that the equations have as much explanatory power as 
they do probably reflects the strong influence the country 
characteristics and circumstances have on government policies 
toward cereal imports.
. . . The empirical results yield certain implications for 
the future of cereal imports by developing countries. It ap 
pears that the rapid growth of cereal imports by developing 
countries during the 1970s, particularly by the middle-income 
countries, will continue to the extent that these countries ex 
perience economic growth and pass into higher stages of 
economic development. Although population growth in the 
developing countries has declined from its peak of about 2.4 
percent in the mid-1960s to about 2.2 percent currently, in 
creasing population pressure on arable land will continue to 
be a significant factor affecting cereal imports in the 
foreseeable future. While food aid as a share of the cereal 
imports of developing countries has declined considerably 
over the 1970s, it will continue perhaps in a more limited 
way to provide cereals to those who could otherwise not af 
ford them. Thus, the same factors that caused the rapid growth 
of cereal imports by the developing countries during the 1970s 
will continue to exert their influence in the 1980s. 7
This line of argument is reasonable and comforting, but it is now 
demonstrably wrong for the 1980s. Why? The world debt crisis, the 
overvalued U.S. dollar, and U.S. farm policy are usually cited as reasons
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why exports of U.S. agricultural products to the developing countries 
have not grown since 1980. Kellogg, for example, drawing on the work 
at ERS by Longmire and Mory on exchange rate problems and by Shane 
and Stallings on the debt crisis, offers the following summary and 
observations:
Although agricultural exports to developing countries have 
increased in the past several years, total U.S. agricultural 
exports have recently decreased from $43.8 billion in 1981 
to $38.0 billion in 1984. There are three major reasons why 
this has happened.
(1) The exchange rate of foreign currencies for U.S. dollars 
has increased. For example, it now takes 32 percent more 
German marks to buy one U.S. dollar's worth of U.S. goods 
than in 1981. A recent USD A study [Longmire and Mory] 
concluded that the stronger dollar cost the United States about 
$6 billion in lost farm exports over the two-year period 
1981-83.
(2) Some U.S. domestic agricultural policies tend to result 
in U.S. agricultural commodities being priced above world 
prices. This is obviously not good policy if one wants to en 
courage agricultural exports in a competitive world economy.
(3) Total world agricultural trade has decreased since 1980 
because of reduced economic growth in many countries and 
increased indebtedness of many developing countries. Shane 
and Stallings have estimated that the debt problem alone has 
lead to a loss in potential export sales to developing coun 
tries of up to 20 percent.
None of these major reasons for declining U.S. agricultural 
exports has to do with increasing agricultural production in 
developing countries which is one of the objectives of U.S. 
universities and AID collaboration. From 1981 to 1984, 
developing country per capita agricultural production has 
essentially remained constant. Therefore, in the aggregate, 
increases in agricultural production within developing coun 
tries has not caused the decline in U.S. agricultural exports 
since 1981. 8
This paper argues that all of these factors the overvalued dollar, U.S. 
agricultural policy, and the mounting debt in developing countries- 
are connected and in turn are related to changing agricultural produc-
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tion in developing countries. Although a focus on any specific factor 
results in a positive relationship between U.S. assistance for agricultural 
development and subsequent value of U.S. farm exports, the picture 
is not so positive when all the factors are considered together. In other 
worlds, a global general equilibrium perspective has different conclu 
sions from those of a partial equilibrium one and has important implica 
tions for the role and impact of U.S. foreign assistance. The ultimate 
conclusions in this paper remain positive, but they contain potentially 
unhappy messages for American agriculture and the need for it to ad 
just to new competitive pressures in world markets.
Explaining Import Demand for Grain
Why do countries import grain? To ask the question in such a bald 
way raises several possibilities other than trade patterns determined by 
short-run costs as reflected in the comparative advantage of trading part 
ners. Recent emphasis on the food price dilemma faced by many develop 
ing countries suggests that grain imports might equally be treated as 
a policy instrument of governments attempting to reach an implicit or 
explicit set of objectives for their food sectors. These objectives can 
range from maintaining a price level (frequently "low") for a prefer 
red foodgrain, assuring price stability, providing "control" over 
foodgrain markets through a government food agency, provisioning a 
livestock-feeding industry that produces meat for urban consumers, or 
even gaining the benefits of free trade. 9
If the volume of grain imports is determined simultaneously with other 
important government policy actions, models designed to predict im 
port levels must come to grips with the basic dynamics of each coun 
try's political economy. In those countries where foodgrain prices are 
an important ingredient in those dynamics, as they are in most coun 
tries of the world, a complex relationship exists among microeconomic 
demand patterns, macroeconomic policies, including basic foodgrain 
prices, and conditions in the world market for food and feedgrains. It 
is as wrong to think that grain imports are determined by relative costs 
and comparative advantage as it is that they are determined solely by
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"political decisions." Each factor influences the other, primarily through 
macroeconomic and budgetary forces. Hence, it is necessary to model 
international grain trading activities in a macro food policy framework. 
Figure 1 shows the first of four different levels of detail in specify 
ing such a model. Few would quarrel with the basic relationship specified 
in Model 1, which says simply that a country's import level is func 
tionally related, through some "black box" of causal mechanisms, to 
its rate of economic growth. What is in the black box is, of course, 
crucial. The figure shows that the primary exogenous factor influenc 
ing the contents of the black box is a country's development strategy, 
especially whether an import-substitution or export-promotion strategy 
is being followed. Much evidence points to a significant influence of 
this strategic choice on the rate of economic growth itself, not just on 
its import intensity. This reverse connection between development 
strategy and economic growth will be incorporated in Model 4 where 
feedback mechanisms are considered. Obviously, other factors such as 
a country's size, its natural resource endowment, and so on also in 
fluence the relationship shown in Model 1.
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Although Model 1 says nothing at all about demand for agricultural 
imports from the United States, its trade balance is strongly influenced 
by the connections in Model 1. In fact, one of the arguments here is 
that, from the point of view of promoting U.S. exports, far more is 
at stake in the overall growth process reflected in Model 1 than in 
agricultural imports per se.
Agricultural imports are the focus of Models 2 and 3. Figure 2 presents 
a rough summary of the structural relationships posited implicitly or 
explicitly in the work cited by Kellogg and summarized in a recent report 
from the Curry Foundation, authored by Paarlberg. 10 The chain of causa 
tion is still fairly simple. Agricultural development, including rising 
staple food production per capita, positively influences the overall 
economic growth process through another black box mechanism. This 
growth translates into import demand through the same factors as in 
Model 1. Overall import demand leads to growing demand for 
agricultural imports, again through a set of complex causal relation 
ships contained in a black box. In Model 2 the black box connecting 
agricultural development with overall economic growth is mediated by 
a country's food policy. 11 The mechanisms that connect overall level 
of imports with agricultural imports includes a system of supply and 
demand relationships for individual commodities as well as the influences 
of income distribution, urbanization, other demographic factors, and 
changing tastes. As stressed above, these mechanisms also include the 
set of food policy objectives, instruments, and interventions.
The expected sign of the statistical relationship between factors con 
nected by black boxes is also shown in figure 2. Normally, each of the 
three relationships should be positive. Agricultural development leads 
to economic growth; economic growth leads to larger import demand; 
and larger overall import demand also leads to larger agricultural im 
ports. The last relationship is the least certain in terms of economic 
logic and rests primarily oiLempirical evidence. Since the relationship 
between rapid income growth and food consumption provides a key 
piece of that evidence, a review of this nexus is a major part of this 
paper. Whatever the historical record, however, it is easy to postulate 
mechanisms that would lead to reduced agricultural imports even in the 
face of economic growth and rising nonagricultural imports.
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Model 2 provides a rough vehicle for understanding the positive rela 
tionship that exists in the historical record between a country's 
agricultural development and its resulting agricultural imports. Each 
of the black boxes, however, contains important economic and political 
relationships which are subject to change compared with the historical 
record. In addition, Model 2 is incomplete in terms of explaining the 
"stabbed in the back" phenomenon because the role of technical 
assistance is not yet connected to agricultural development in develop 
ing countries, nor are agricultural imports into a particular country 
translated into the value of U.S. agricultural exports.
Figure 2
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Model 3 attempts to specify these additional relationships. Great con 
troversy exists over the efficacy of technical assistance in helping low- 
income countries develop their agricultural sectors. Some would argue 
that the record is mostly negative; inappropriate technologies and com 
modities are stressed at the expense of village-level knowledge and foods 
of the poor. 12 At the other end of the spectrum is a "science solves 
all food problems" approach which sees a strong positive link between 
foreign assistance and agricultural development. 13 The black box con 
necting these two components of Model 3 reflects these controversies 
by linking technical assistance and agricultural development through 
the choice of an aid strategy. Perhaps the critical strategic choice is 
whether the aid focuses on project or policy assistance, a topic which 
is now receiving much attention in the donor community, with results 
that are beginning to show in world markets.
Model 3 shows two additional components relative to the simple struc 
ture of Model 2. A connection between a country's agricultural imports 
and the volume of U.S. agricultural exports is mediated by factors deter 
mining the competitiveness of U.S. commodities in international markets, 
especially exchange rates and domestic pricing policies, as well as by 
market development efforts by the United States, including the role of 
the PL-480 program. But the United States is concerned with not only 
the volume of agricultural exports but their value as well. To connect 
volume with value, it is necessary to determine the price received for 
the exported commodity. This connection is shown in Model 3 by the 
black box that contains the mechanisms of price formation in interna 
tional commodity markets. This particular black box contains many of 
the global general equilibrium mechanisms that provide cause for con 
cern that the historical record of the 1960s and 1970s will not play out 
so nicely for American farmers in the 1980s and 1990s.
Just as in Model 2, all of the expected statistical relationships con 
tained in the black boxes in Model 3 are positive in sign. Considerable 
debate exists, however, over the two relationships at the bottom. There 
is no doubt that the total volume of U.S. grain exports, for example, 
is positively related to the volume of world trade in grain. But figure 
4 shows that the structure of that relationship depends critically on the
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role of the United States in world grain markets. If, as many analysts 
have argued, the United States has become the de facto "supplier of 
last resort," the slope of the line that relates percentage changes in the 
volume of world grain trade to percentage changes in U.S. grain ex 
ports will be significantly greater than one. If the U.S. were a large 
but fully competitive country, the slope should be approximately one. 
If the United States were a small country in world grain trade, the slope 
should not be significantly different from zero. For the 25 years be 
tween 1960 and 1984 the coefficient was 1.86 and the r-statistic 8.2.
An additional issue concerns the strength of the relationship between 
the volume of U.S. agricultural exports and the value of those exports. 
If there were a fixed and known elasticity of demand for those exports, 
the sign could be determined unambiguously. But that elasticity is an 
outcome rather than a cause of the relationship. Again, three relation 
ships are plausible, depending on the role of the United States in world 
grain markets and the size and competitiveness of those markets. As 
figure 5 illustrates, if the United States acts as a supplier of last resort, 
there should be a positive relationship between changes in the price it 
receives for grain exports and changes in the volume of those exports, 
which thus guarantees a positive overall relationship between export 
volume and export value.
If the United States is merely a regular competitor in world grain 
markets, there should be no significant relationship between its export 
volume and price received. If the United States acts as a large com 
petitor in pursuit of market share in world grain markets, however, a 
significant negative relationship should exist between its export volume 
and price. This is the critical elasticity of demand for U.S. exports that 
is needed to determine whether export volume and value are positively 
related under this trade strategy, but it is precisely the elasticity that 
is unobservable from historic data if previous policy has not pursued 
this strategy. The statistical record for the same 25 years shows no signifi 
cant relationship between percentage changes in either nominal or 
deflated world grain prices and percentage changes in U.S. grain ex 
ports, with or without a one-year lag, although the sign is always negative 
in the estimated functions.
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Figure 5
Relationship Between Percentage Change in United States 
Grain Exports and Export Price of Grain
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The question can now be put directly: what is known from Model 
3 about the relationship between technical assistance and agricultural 
development in developing countries at the one end and the volume and 
value of U.S. agricultural exports at the other? The historical record 
suggests that each black box is likely to encompass a set of mechanisms 
that generate a net positive relationship between the input factor and 
the resulting output. If all the black boxes have positive signs, the overall 
relationship between agricultural development and U.S. agricultural ex 
ports should also be positive. This is exactly the result that Kellogg and 
his colleagues have found. So we have some confidence that Model 3 
captures the short-run and panial equilibrium mechanisms connecting 
these two factors.
Two potentially important elements are missing in Model 3. First, 
the short-run links treated in Model 3 may be superimposed on more 
powerful, but lagged, connections that operate in the opposite direc 
tion. Some of these lagged relationships are economic but some work 
primarily through political choices made in the face of pressures 
emanating from the outcomes in Model 3. Second, price formation in 
world commodity markets cannot be treated in a partial equilibrium 
framework. The potential commodity substitutions and impact of finan 
cial variables such as debt and exchange rates have a powerful influence 
on these prices, which in turn enter the economic and political feed 
back mechanisms just noted. When these concerns are added to the linear 
format of Model 3, a much more complex set of relationships emerges, 
as is shown in Model 4 in figure 6.
The unidirectional causation of Model 3 gives way in Model 4 to 
several circular feedback mechanisms. Two have already been noted: 
the impact of inward- or outward-looking development strategies on 
the rate of economic growth and import demand; and the impact of food 
policy on agricultural development and its mediating role between that 
development and overall economic growth. 14
The broader feedback mechanisms incorporate connections from both 
markets and political economy dynamics. On the left side of figure 6, 
signals from world commodity markets influence both agricultural 
development and economic growth, although with various lags. To the 
extent that market prices are communicated directly to farmers, the
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Figure 6
Feedback Effects in the Relationship Between Technical Assistance 
and the Value of United States Agricultural Exports
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crucial issue is the supply responsiveness of a nation's farmers to price 
incentives. This responsiveness is obviously a function of time and of 
public sector responsiveness as well. At the farm level, farmers might 
shift the area devoted to various commodities in the short run, or change 
fertilizer applications. In the longer run they can invest in water con 
trol, better production technology, and greater specialization if the market 
will take away their output and provide ample supplies of needed 
household consumption items in return.
The influence of world commodity markets on economic growth is 
through different mechanisms. By determining the amount of foreign 
exchange earned for a given volume of commodity exports, these markets 
directly influence how binding the foreign exchange constraint is. At 
the same time, the signals provide incentives to local entrepreneurs to 
supply export markets as opposed to domestic markets. Depressed world 
commodity markets tend to lead to depressed domestic markets through 
local price competition. Consequently, in those countries that permit 
relatively free transmission of world market prices into their domestic 
economies, a strong link exists between those markets and performance 
in agricultural development and overall economic growth. If one con 
sequence of previous rapid agricultural development (and other factors 
influencing commodity prices) is to push down those prices on world 
commodity markets, then at least one market mechanism is established 
that will dampen further agricultural development and economic growth 
and thereby lead to a reduction in demand from developing countries 
for commodities from these markets.
The right side of figure 6 shows that there are important political 
economy mechanisms that establish this connection as well. Growing 
agricultural imports, especially at high prices, induce countries to devote 
more attention to their agricultural sectors to reduce their political ex 
posure to unstable world markets. This wariness must be one of the 
major outcomes of the world food crisis in the mid-1970s. Some of 
the high prices of that period were felt directly by farmers as countries 
simply lost control of their domestic price stabilization programs. More 
important for the long run, however, was the signal to governments 
that it would be both expensive and politicially dangerous to rely on
104 Timmer
world markets for basic grains, a lesson that was reinforced by the soy 
bean embargo and Soviet grain embargo attempted by the United States. 
The result was implementation of price policies with better incentives 
for farmers, more investment in rural infrastructure such as roads and 
irrigation, and far more serious attention to the development of an in 
digenous agricultural research and extension capacity (all of which are 
now the ingredients of "good" policy advice).
All of these changes take time to manifest themselves in terms of in 
creased output, but when it arrives on domestic markets, a double-edged 
effect is felt on import demand from world commodity markets. Higher 
real prices in domestic markets induce both greater production and reduc 
ed demand. The result is sharply reduced import demand or even a switch 
to exports of important food and feed grains, as in the case of Indonesia, 
China, and India. If related factors such as falling petroleum prices and 
high debt levels are contributing to slowed economic growth in low- 
and middle-income countries, the added market supplies meet very slug 
gish growth in demand and thus exacerbate the downward price pressures 
on agricultural commodity markets. In a rather perverse twist, the fall 
ing petroleum prices and attempts to earn foreign exchange to meet debt 
repayment schedules reinforce these dynamics because agricultural ex 
ports have a shorter lead time and learning curve than industrial ex 
ports and face less protection in developed countries (until now). A rather 
vicious downward spiral is set in motion, which was initiated by an 
apparently healthy response to the world food crisis of the 1970s and 
the recycling of petrodollars.
How does the United States respond in such a situation? With surplus 
agricultural commodities on hand and a stark picture of hunger televis 
ed on the evening news, one temptation is to renew the market develop 
ment thrust of the PL-480 program, to feed the hungry with America's 
bounty. But the potential dangers to agricultural development efforts 
of dumping our surpluses in substantial quantities into a country's 
domestic food markets are now well recognized. 15 Most countries would 
accept such food aid only if it directly offset commercial imports other 
wise planned. Since this is contrary to both the letter and intent of the 
law, sharply expanded PL-480 shipments do not seem possible.
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The commercial competitiveness of U.S. commodities is determin 
ed primarily by the value of the dollar in foreign currency markets and 
by domestic farm policy. Both of these factors are affected by prices 
in world markets and, in turn, have feedback effects on the outcome 
of each of the relationships shown in Model 4. Just as the devaluation 
of the dollar in the early 1970s for reasons unconnected to agriculture 
stimulated U.S. agricultural exports and farm earnings, so did its pro 
gressive revaluation during the early 1980s dampen those exports and 
earnings. The U.S. Congress does not legislate much positive agricultural 
trade policy; it does, however, set domestic agricultural price policy 
to protect farm incomes. The effect until the 1985 Farm Bill was to 
set the prices of many U.S. export commodities above those of the com 
petition and thus lose market share, which resulted in higher prices for 
our competitors than would prevail with open competition.
The political economy dynamics of this approach are now becoming 
clear. Large budget deficits forced Congress to design a more com 
petitive farm price policy even in the face of existing low incomes in 
the American farm sector (but large deficit costs remained because of 
continued target price support). Additional commodities will move on 
to world markets and drive prices down even further, at least temporarily. 
The lower prices make imports even more attractive to those countries 
open to international grain trade, but they simultaneously threaten fur 
ther those countries that maintain active price policies on behalf of their 
farmers. Providing better price incentives to farmers in developing coun 
tries has become a main theme of policy advice that accompanies 
technical and financial assistance. A major contradiction is emerging 
between market signals and important elements in the agricultural 
development process. As American farmers watch more and more coun 
tries protect themselves from the pressures of low-priced U.S. 
agricultural commodities, the political pressures will increase on the 
land grant universities, USAID, and USD A to stop their assistance to 
agricultural development programs. Slowing the pace of agricultural 
development, however, will in fact slow the pace of economic growth 
in the developing countries. They will then serve as less dynamic markets 
for U.S. exports of all goods and services, including, in the short run, 
exports of agricultural commodities.
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The Historical Record and Income-Led Growth
Despite the perilous and complicated feedback mechanisms that seem 
to be operating in Model 4, the long-run growth of agricultural imports 
in developing countries has been a stimulus to U.S. agricultural exports. 
Figure 7 shows the shares of U.S. agricultural exports to various destina 
tions for fiscal year 1976-77 and projected for 1984-85. The share of 
developing countries, including China, rose from 35.5 percent in 1976-77 
to 40.4 percent in 1984-85. The nominal value of total exports rose 
roughly 60 percent during that time while the consumer price index 
rose about 80 percent. After inflation, the real purchases of U.S. 
agricultural commodities by developing countries remained almost con 
stant, helping to offset a decline in the real value of purchases from 
Western and Eastern Europe, Canada, and Oceania. Real purchases from 
Japan and the U.S.S.R. increased significantly.
Two quite separate forces seem to be at work in generating the in 
creased demand for agricultural imports in developing countries. The 
first, and the smaller in absolute terms, is the failure of domestic 
agricultural production to keep pace with population growth and food 
demand in urban areas. This is primarily an African phenomenon. Table 
1 shows that African imports of grain have increased from a total of 
5.9 million metric tons in 1970 to an average of 24.9 million metric 
tons for the 1980-83 period, or by 13.3 percent per year. During the 
same period, production of corn, rice, and wheat increased 2.2 per 
cent per year, substantially behind the 2.9 percent per year increase 
in population. Real per capita incomes have also been falling during 
this time, although certain regions and countries have shown signifi 
cant increases. 16
The great bulk of increased demand for U.S. agricultural exports over 
the past two decades has come from income-induced patterns of food 
consumption. This is most readily apparent from table 2, which is 
reproduced from Monke's paper on international grain trade for the 
World Bank. 17 Total growth in import demand for cereals between 
1948-52 and 1979-81 was over 170 million metric tons, of which Monke 
attributes about 30 million metric tons to declines in per capita grain 
production and about 33.5 million metric tons to population growth.
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Figure 7
U.S. Agricultural Export Percentage Shares to Selected Destinations 


























SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural 
Trade of the United States (Washington, D.C.), March-April 1985 and various other issues.
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The remainder, 107 million metric tons, is a residual that must be ac 
counted for by rising per capita incomes, changing tastes, urbaniza 
tion, and so on.
Table 1
African Grain Imports by Region in Millions of Metric Tons 
1970 and Yearly Average 1980-83
Percent change 
Grain/Region 1970 1980-83 1970 to 1980-83
Corn
N. Africa .10 




N. Africa .05 
S. Africa .08 
Sub-Saharan Africa .65
Total .78
Wheat and Wheat Flour, 
Wheat Equivalent
N. Africa 2.79 



























SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Trade Yearbook (Rome,
Italy), various issues.
Totals may not add up due to rounding.
The patterns of food demand generated by rising incomes have been 
studied for well over a century, and Engels Law—the declining share 
of food expenditures in total household expenditures as per capita in 
comes rise—has been well-documented from both time series and cross
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SOURCE: Eric A. Monke, "International Grain Trade, 1950-80," AGREP Division Working Paper (Washington, D.C.. The World Bank, January 1983). 
a. Calculations for CPEs are made for the 1960-80 penod, due to lack of data on intra-CPE trade for the 1948/52 period. Trade between market economics 
and CPEs was extremely small during this period, but increased substantially during the 1950s. If per capita imports by CPEs during the 1948/52 period 
were assumed equal to those of 1960, the effects of population growth on trade would increase to 2.77 and 4.15 million metric tons for the developed 
and developing CPEs, respectively. These calculations yield overestimates, and do not alter the conclusions presented in the text.
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section data. The changing composition of the diet with rising incomes 
has also been scrutinized as agricultural ministries search for com 
modities with bright prospects for consumer demand in order to max 
imize the payoff to their research and extension efforts. 18
Relatively less attention has been given to the indirect demand for 
commodities generated by the food consumption patterns of the more 
affluent. In 1974, Lester Brown presented a striking table showing the 
indirect demand for grain at income levels at which grain-fed livestock 
products became affordable. Grain demand per capita in the United States 
and Canada, for example, totaled five times the amount in India or 
China. 19 In times of grain shortages and pessimism over future sup 
plies, this large indirect demand for grain was interpreted as a threat 
to the world's capacity to feed its poorer population. In times of surplus, 
indirect demand for grain is seen as an important source of export 
markets for U.S. farmers, and so it is worth examining the relation 
ship between income and grain demand more closely.
The relationship depends heavily on the distinction between quantity 
and quality of the diet. Both of these attributes change as incomes in 
crease, but the quality dimension is much more income-elastic after 
minimum caloric intake levels are reached. Tables 3 and 4 report the 
results of a systematic attempt to quantify these different trends; Ap 
pendix 1 shows the sources of data for the 34 countries in the sample 
and the composition of the 117 cases drawn from those countries. The 
income variable is measured in purchasing power parity as determined 
by Kravis and his colleagues. Prices are measured with similar ad 
justments to market or official exchange rates; consequently much of 
the real income effect of different price levels between poor and rich 
countries has already been captured in the income variable. Any 
significance of the variable measuring food prices relative to nonfood 
prices is thus capturing a pure substitution effect rather than an overall 
market effect, which includes both the real income effect of price changes 
as well as the substitution effect.
The first seven equations have log of caloric intake as the dependent 
variable. For the total sample, per capita income has a very high ex 
planatory power, and the income elasticity is equal to 0.20 when in 
come is entered alone in Equation Cl. It remains as high as 0.15 in
Table 3
Elasticity Coefficients from Calorie Intake Regression Analysis 
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Equation C5 when variables are included for calorie requirements (which 
reflect average body size, activity levels, and climate) and for price 
response in low-income countries.
When the price variable is added in Equation C2, the income elasticity 
drops only slightly; the price elasticity is -0.1 and significant only at 
the 10 percent level. Prices and incomes are negatively correlated after 
the Kravis adjustments, and so the income variable captures some of 
the price effect. With prices alone in the equation, the estimated elasticity 
rises in absolute value from -0.10 to -0.66.
The elasticities for developing countries are expected to be larger than 
those for developed countries. The income elasticity should be higher 
because caloric intake has physical limits—"the narrow confines of the 
human stomach." The price elasticity estimated here, which is close 
to a pure substitution effect, should be higher because of the "Timmer 
effect," which states that "the pure substitution elasticity tends to decline 
in absolute size as incomes rise at about half the rate of decline in in 
come elasticities. . . ." 20
These issues are tested in Equations C6 and C7, which report separate 
equations for subsamples of the developed and less-developed nations. 
The income and price elasticities for developed countries are much lower 
than those for the developing countries and were not statistically signifi 
cant. The Timmer effect was roughly confirmed. The decline in income 
elasticity from 0.15 for low-income countries to 0.06 for the high-income 
countries represents a decline of 60 percent. The decline in the substitu 
tion elasticity should therefore be about 30 percent. The actual decline 
is 50 percent, but a 30 percent decline is well within the likely margin 
or error.
The estimates of the "calorie requirement elasticity" in Equations 
C4 and C5 have little operational meaning other than the obvious: a 
1 percent increase in "requirements" does not automatically lead to 
a 1 percent increase in caloric intake. Per capita incomes and food prices 
play a critical role in determining whether requirements can actually 
be satisfied.
Three measures of dietary quality are analyzed in table 4. Equation 
Ql shows the starchy staple ratio regressed against income. The elasticity
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of -0.39 is highly significant and has substantial predictive power, as 
the simple equation has an R2 of 0.74. Even the introduction of low- 
income slope and intercept shifters, along with a price term, raises the 
R2 only to 0.80. Per capita incomes are clearly the dominant factor ex 
plaining this measure of dietary quality. To the extent a difference is 
likely to exist in income elasticities for the starchy staple ratio, the 
elasticity for developed countries should be larger in absolute terms. 
This would happen partly because the population of poor countries would 
exhibit a certain inertia in behavior—many wealthy individuals in Asia 
do not feel they have "eaten" without rice at a meal. In addition, signifi 
cant scope exists for upgrading the diets of low-income populations 
within the context of starchy staples. Wheat can thus substitute for 
sorghum, or maize for cassava, and then rice for maize. Only when 
diets begin to diversify dramatically in quantitative terms to meat, sugar, 
fish, milk, and other high-quality and expensive calories does the 
starchy staple ratio decline rapidly.
This hypothesis is borne out in Equations Q5 and Q6. Separate equa 
tions for developed and developing countries show that the income 
elasticity of the starchy staple ratio is -0.64 and -0.23, respectively. 
Both coefficients are highly significant. A different formulation in Equa 
tion Q3 using dummy variables for low per capita incomes found vir 
tually identical results.
The three equations for protein illustrate a characteristic of this par 
ticular sample and a behavioral relationship of some significance. Equa 
tion Q7 shows a protein-income elasticity of 0.25 when the total sam 
ple is combined. When the sample is split, the elasticity for developed 
countries is 0.04 and the low-income elasticity is 0.15. Neither elasticity 
from the split sample is as high as from the combined sample. Normal 
ly, the elasticity for the total sample should be a weighted average of 
the two subsamples. That is not true here for two reasons. First, the 
developed country sample represents a different population from that 
of the developing country sample due to different calorie requirements 
as well as to a host of other "modern'' traits that do not come immediate 
ly with higher incomes. Second, patterns of behavior take considerable 
time to adjust to changed income levels. The elasticities for each sam-
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pie separately can be thought of as representing short-run adjustments 
to income change, whereas the elasticity for the combined sample 
represents a long-run adjustment.
Equations Q10 to Q12 examine the relationship between animal pro 
tein and incomes. The income elasticity for animal protein is 0.77 for 
all countries but only 0.65 and 0.47 for developing and developed coun 
tries, respectively, which again shows the potential importance of short- 
run versus long-run dietary adaptations to income change. The implica 
tions of these large income elasticities for animal protein can be seen 
in table 5, which is patterned after Brown and reports both direct con 
sumption of grain per capita and indirect consumption through livestock 
feeding, for a variety of countries from the United States to India. 21 
Despite direct intake of grain in the United States of almost exactly one- 
half the Indian level, total grain consumed is 4.5 times as large as In 
dia's total grain consumption per capita—646 kilograms per years as 
opposed to 143 kilograms. The level was even higher before U.S. 
livestock feeders sharply reduced their feeding of grain in the wake of 
high grain prices in the mid-1970s.
A significant impact will be felt on world grain markets if' 'follower'' 
countries adopt American-style diets and the indirect demand for grain 
implicit in them. If all the countries from Japan and below in table 5 
were to reach the average level of grain consumed in the United Kingdom 
and Germany (340 kilograms per capita per year, a figure only slightly 
more than half the United States level), more than 300 million metric 
tons of additional grain would be needed, a figure equal to one-sixth 
of global production of grain. Excluding both India and China from 
the calculation leaves an added grain demand of more than 60 million 
metric tons, more than one-quarter of world grain trade in recent years.
If income growth precedes rapidly in these countries, the derived de 
mand for grain through increased meat consumption will be a major 
factor determining the balance between supply and demand in world 
grain markets. Failure of incomes to grow as rapidly as in the past, 
however, will depress demand and could lead to significant grain 
surpluses in years of good harvests. If, in addition, there has been a 
structural change in the interaction of developing countries with world 
grain markets, as was argued previously, the outlook for American
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grain farmers is bleak indeed. This bleak outlook stems not from "sur 
prises" in the black boxes, that is, in fundamentally different mechanisms 
connecting each level of a developing country's food system with the 
next. Rather, the changed outlook comes through the relatively greater 
importance of feedback mechanisms as income growth slows down. The 
more that income growth is stimulated through assistance to agricultural 
development, the more powerful will the feedback effects become. In 
addition, a set of largely external factors are impinging to make the pros 
pects for U.S. grain exports in the 1980s less favorable than they were 
in the 1970s or even the 1960s. 22
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SOURCE: FAO, Food Balance Sheets, 1975-1977.
NOTE: Grain consumed indirectly is not corrected for imports and exports of meat and poultry.
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The first of these factors is the unusual pattern of economic growth 
in the 1970s. The especially successful examples of agriculturally-led 
economic growth spilling over into rising agricultural imports have been 
in East Asia—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. All three countries have 
very low ratios of land to population, and all have relied heavily on 
industrial exports to the United States and Western Europe to fuel their 
growth, which has been extraordinarily rapid by either historic or con 
temporary comparative standards. While further gains in U.S. 
agricultural exports to these markets are possible, the largest increases 
have already been achieved. In addition, the United States faces sharp 
competition for these markets from other Asian countries whose ex 
port sectors have been stimulated by market-oriented food policies and 
the new structure of world commodity markets. Thailand, China, and 
Indonesia have the capacity to meet much of the rising demand for 
feedgrains in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. If Burma and Indo-China 
ever adopt market-oriented food policies that provide better farm in 
centives and public infrastructure for improved agricultural productivity, 
Asia could be awash in surplus grain.
The opportunities to reproduce the East Asian pattern of the 1960s 
and 1970s are practically nil. The lucrative markets of the OECD coun 
tries are increasingly closed to exports from newly industrializing coun 
tries. To earn the foreign exchange needed to import capital goods and 
to pay existing debt, most countries will be forced to export agricultural 
rather than industrial goods. The result will be added competition in 
world commodity markets, either directly as with rice, corn, soybeans, 
or cotton, or indirectly as with palm oil, rubber, or jute. As more coun 
tries seek sources of growth in agriculture, these competitive pressures 
will increase, and commodity prices will remain depressed.
Second, the technological basis for agricultural development in the 
1980s and 1990s is likely to be significantly different from that in the 
1970s. The Green Revolution of the 1970s was primarily based on wheat 
and rice systems with good water control. Much of the increase in U.S. 
agricultural exports in the 1970s was in coarse grains and soybeans, 
crops for which little new technology was applicable to the tropics. 
Because of significant progress in breeding and cultivation techniques,
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substantially higher yields for most of the coarse grains are now possi 
ble in the humid tropics, and similar progress may be in sight for 
legumes. 23
A third factor depressing the outlook for U.S. agricultural exports 
is the erosion of its cost advantage in producing higher value-added prod 
ucts such as broilers, soymeal and oil, and textiles. When the basic com 
modities that provide the raw materials for these products cost more 
for domestic producers than they do for international competitors such 
as Thailand, Brazil, or China, it is impossible to retain markets previous 
ly established or to gain new ones. Between 1980-81 and 1983-84, the 
export of oilseed meals and poultry dropped by 34.4 percent, whereas 
overall U.S. agricultural exports fell by "only" 10.8 percent.
In total, three general sets of factors seem destined to make the> 1980s 
a very different decade from the 1970s for American farmers: reduced 
global rates of growth in incomes; general equilibrium feedback effects 
on world commodity markets; and several specific features with respect 
to countries, technologies, and cost structures. There is only a limited 
response that U.S. policy can make in this new environment. Reduc 
ing the value of the dollar by bringing government expenditures in closer 
balance with revenues may raise the dollar price of commodities in world 
markets and help make American farmers more competitive, but it will 
make exports from developing countries less competitive and slow their 
rate of growth. The net effect on commodity markets is not clearly 
positive, and the dollar's decline since February 1985 has not helped 
very much by early 1987.
A more competitive pricing structure for U.S. farm products will help 
regain market share and also lower input costs for value-added prod 
ucts. But it will also drive down prices in world markets, at least in 
the short run, leaving basic commodity producers worse off.
United States technical assistance can focus on raising agricultural 
productivity in developing countries and rely on historical relationships 
to speed their economic growth and demand for agricultural imports. 
But if the lagged feedback mechanisms from both the market and political 
economy continue to push countries toward smaller food imports and 
increased emphasis on agricultural exports, the general equilibrium con-
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sequences of this strategy mean it will backfire as a vehicle for assisting 
American farmers.
One can only conclude that no solution exists to the problem of low 
incomes of American farmers if the policy intends for present farmers 
to produce more output at higher prices. A competition-oriented policy 
that drives down world prices may eventually force some high-cost com 
petitors, especially smaller farms in Europe, out of the market, but it 
will lead to a significant shake-out of American producers as well. From 
the comfort of a university it is easy to say that this is inevitable, even 
good for farmers, because they will earn higher incomes in the industrial 
or service sector. Jobs in those sectors, however, depend on the general 
health of the United States economy, and this in turn depends on overall 
American competitiveness and capacity to sell abroad. And this returns 
the story to the very simple relationship in figure 1, in which economic 
growth in developing countries leads to increased import demand in 
general. Finding ways to help these countries speed their general develop 
ment process is the critical task for the United States if it wants a healthy 
economy at home. The evidence and logic point to rapid agricultural 
development as the key to this process, even if it increases competitive 
pressures on American agriculture through a complicated web of feed 
back and general equilibrium processes. Policies that help farmers cope 
with these pressures by easing the pain of structural change are the 
only appropriate response.
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Six Challenges for Scientists, 
Policymakers and Politicians
Carl K. Eicher 
Michigan State University
Nineteen-sixty is usually referred to as the beginning of Africa's in 
dependence movement because 16 African colonies won their in 
dependence in that year. Over the 1960 to 1985 period, however, at 
least 40 of the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa wasted a generation 
in failing to develop their agriculture as an engine of growth of their 
national economies. After several decades of independence, Africa is 
still the poorest part of the world's economy and seven of every ten 
Africans live in rural areas. The dreams of African leaders of skipping 
stages of development and catching up with the rich countries in one 
or two generations have all but vanished, as despair, frustration and 
disappointment have become the code words in African political circles.
When African countries started to reclaim their independence in the 
1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa was a modest net exporter of food—mostly 
groundnuts (peanuts) and palm oil to Europe. But Africa slowly lost 
its capacity to feed itself during the sixties. The situation deteriorated 
further in the seventies with the drought and famine in the Sahelian region 
of West Africa. During the 15-year period from 1970 to 1984, Africa's 
population grew at twice the rate of growth of food production. In 1985, 
25 years after independence, 22 African states appealed to the interna 
tional community for emergency food aid and 300,000 people died in 
the Great Ethiopian Famine.
In Africa's first 25 years of independence, only four or five of the 
forty-five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa gave priority to agriculture 
and to feeding their people. The remaining countries paid lip service
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to agriculture while emphasizing industrialization, state control and the 
taxation of agriculture. In this essay, I shall look back 25 years and 
examine why Africa wasted a generation in developing its agricultural 
base. I shall then look ahead and examine what can be done to end hunger 
in Africa over the next 25 years. I have taken the long view, i.e., the 
long pull—because there is little that can be done over the next five 
to ten years to slow population growth and end hunger in Africa.
Hunger can be defined as the inability of households to produce, pur 
chase or acquire a calorie-adequate diet throughout the year. I shall 
focus on calories rather than protein because recent research has shown 
that, with the exception of pregnant women and nursing mothers, the 
protein needs of most people can be met if enough calories are con 
sumed from multiple sources.
Although there are currently more hungry people in Asia than in Africa 
because of the sheer size of Asia's population relative to Africa, the 
most challenging and intractable problems of hunger and famine are 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: an immense land area of 45 countries, 7 col 
onial histories, and more than 1,000 different ethnic groups. 1 Moreover, 
most Asian countries have made enormous progress over the past few 
decades in controlling famine before it becomes a local or national 
disaster. For example, the last major famine in Asia occurred in 
Bangladesh in 1974 when 1.5 million people perished. In Africa, 
however, famine has not been brought under control. Famine in the 
Sahelian zone of West Africa in the early 1970s was followed by the 
Great African Famine in Ethiopia and Somalia of 1985.
Since Africa is an integral part of the international food equation, 
I shall examine the goal to end hunger in Africa in an international con 
text, including the use of donor assistance and food aid in increasing 
food production and access to food. The hallmark of the world food 
equation of the late 1980s is underproduction of food in many African 
countries, overproduction in industrial nations such as the United States, 
Canada, Europe, Japan and Australia, and emerging overproduction 
of food in some Third World nations such as Brazil and India. For ex 
ample, India recently joined the ranks of food aid donors when it 
delivered 100,000 tons of food aid to Africa in 1985. India plans to
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donate 35,000 tons of grain to Africa in 1987. Although India's achieve 
ment of food self-sufficiency and its generosity to Africa are to be ad 
mired, it should be pointed out that roughly 200 million or one-fourth 
of India's population are hungry and unable to acquire a calorie-adequate 
diet. The hungry in India are the landless, jobless, poor, and the destitute 
who are unable to produce, purchase or acquire enough calories to lead 
a normal life. Under these circumstances, why should India ship food 
aid to Africa except to gain political capital? Th lesson that emerges 
from India's experience for Africa is that the expansion of food pro 
duction and the achievement of national food self-sufficiency will not 
automatically end hunger.
It is important to debate African hunger in the United States because 
there is a great deal of misinformation and facile slogans being peddl 
ed on the need for Africans to produce more food and fewer cash crops, 
the belief that hunger can be ended simply by increasing food produc 
tion and the belief in some circles that hunger in Africa is caused by 
multinational firms and international capitalism.
I have chosen to discuss six challenges for ending hunger in Africa:
1. The challenge of learning why the first generation of African 
political leaders, policymakers, and their foreign advisors under 
valued agriculture and food production over the 1960-84 period,
2. The challenge of slowing rapid population growth,
3. The human capital challenge,
4. The challenge of focusing on the prime movers of increasing food 
and agricultural production,
5. The challenge of reducing poverty and increasing access to food,
6. The challenge of reordering foreign aid priorities.
The Challenge of Learning from the Mistakes 
of the First Generation of African Leaders 
and Their Foreign Advisors: 1960 to 1985
Two essential questions must be addressed in an analysis of the poor 
performance of agriculture in the postindependence period. First, what
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role did African states assign to agriculture and the industrial sectors 
in national development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s? Second, what 
strategies were used by African states to increase food and agricultural 
production?
The postindependence experience provides a clear answer to the first 
question. Most western economic advisors to African governments in 
the 1960s promoted industrialization, rural to urban migration, and the 
taxation of agriculture. With the exception of a few countries such as 
the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Rwanda, Kenya and Malawi, African 
political leaders undervalued agriculture and gave priority to industrial 
development at the same time the agriculture sector was usually heavi 
ly taxed to finance industrial projects and the urban symbols of moder 
nization such as a soccer stadium, a new House of Parliament and a 
four-lane highway from the international airport to independence square 
in the capital city.
In the 1960s, most African heads of state did not believe in investing 
in the agricultural sector because of the view that industrialization of 
fered the most rapid avenue to change the structure of African economies 
from traditional agrarian/export-dominated economies to modern in 
dustrial economies. But in practice, industrialization has proven to be 
more complex than imagined. Throughout Africa, industrial plants are 
now standing idle because of inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption 
and lack of markets. For example, while visiting Tanzania in October 
of 1985,1 observed that the government-owned shoe factory in Morogoro 
that was financed by a World Bank loan was operating at 4.5 percent 
of capacity. I also observed that the cashew nut processing plants were 
standing idle because it was cheaper to ship raw cashew nuts to India 
for hand shelling because the unskilled wage in India was substantially 
lower than in Tanzania.
Why did most African heads of state impose such heavy taxes on 
agriculture for financing large-scale industrial projects? There is con 
sistent evidence that African heads of state in anglophone and fran 
cophone states associated poverty and underdevelopment with colonial 
strategies of producing agricultural exports—sisal, cocoa, oil palm, rub 
ber and coffee—for European markets. Whether the head of state was
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espousing capitalism or socialism, there was a view that continued in 
vestment in export crops for overseas markets would be risky and would 
continue Africa's dependence on western markets. This point of view 
is reflected in the late Walter Rodney's immensely popular book in 
African universities—How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1974).
Houphet-Boigny—the President of the Ivory Coast and Hastings Ban- 
da, Life President of Malawi, are shining examples of veteran politi 
cians who promoted agricultural development over the past 25 years. 
Blessed with a rich natural resource base, adequate rainfall and an open- 
door policy to immigrants from neighboring countries, today the Ivory 
Coast is a middle-income nation with a per capita income several times 
higher than that of Ghana even though Ghana was by far the richest 
country in West Africa at independence in 1958. Malawi, a landlocked 
country with a poor natural resource base, is not only self-sufficient 
in maize, the staple food, but it has exported maize for seven of the 
past ten years.
Over the past three to five years there has been a growing awareness 
among new African leaders such as Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, President Diouf of Senegal, and President Mwinyi of Tan 
zania, that an agriculture-led development strategy should be pursued 
in economies where 70 to 90 percent of the people live in rural areas 
and petroleum and minerals are not available to generate adequate foreign 
exchange. However, because of the diversity of Africa's natural resource 
base and opportunities for development, there is no single agricultural 
development model that can be advocated for Africa. The relative em 
phasis that a national development strategy gives to industry, mining 
and/or agriculture must be sorted out on a country-to-country basis. 
But we can conclude after 25 years of independence that most African 
states are starting to give greater priority to investment in agriculture 
and less to industry than they did five to ten years ago.
The second question—how to develop agriculture—was answered in 
most African states in the 1960s by narrow assumptions about African 
farmers and herders and a belief in the ease of importing agricultural 
technology and models of production (e.g., large-scale farms and 
ranches) from industrial countries. In Africa, in the 1960s—as in Asia and
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Latin America in the 1950s—farmers and livestock owners were assumed 
to be irrational, inefficient and bound to a culture of tradition and poverty. 
It was also assumed by many African leaders and their foreign advisors 
that large-scale farms, plantations and ranches were more efficient than 
small farms. Throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, African govern 
ments, donors and foreign advisors assumed that food crop technology 
was ' 'on the shelf' or that it could be imported from temperate climates 
in Europe and North America. It was further assumed that the adop 
tion of improved technology could be speeded up by increasing the 
number of extension agents to "educate" farmers on the need to spend 
less time on feasts, festivals and sorghum beer parties and more time 
on increasing food production. Many African governments followed 
this advice and from 1959 to 1980, the 45 countries in Africa hired 
an additional 50,000 extension agents under the mistaken assumption 
that extension agents, rather than technical packages, 2 were the miss 
ing link in developing African agriculture.
With few exceptions, the first generation of African leaders, whether 
they were the leaders of civilian, military, radical or conservative 
regimes—were consistent in giving priority to industrial/urban develop 
ment, exploiting farmers and rural people by imposing harsh taxes on 
export crops and giving rural people little voice in setting national 
agriculture policies and development priorities. The first generation also 
failed to understand that agricultural development is a slow, evolutionary 
and complex process that does not lend itself to rhetoric, ideology or 
to crash food production campaigns. Since most countries wasted a 
generation in developing their agriculture, the challenge for the second 
generation of African leaders is to learn from the mistakes of the past 
in addressing the challenge of developing African agriculture and end 
ing hunger. But the bottom line is that many older African leaders must 
be replaced with a new generation who realize that Africa's poverty 
and underdevelopment is, to a large extent, the result of misguided na 
tional development strategies that gave priority to industrialization rather 
than strengthening the agricultural base as a precondition for industrial 
development.
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The Challenge of Slowing Rapid Population Growth
Africa's 3.2 percent annual rate of population growth is the highest 
in the world. In fact, the total population in the region is estimated to 
increase from 460 million in 1985 to 730 million in year 2000, an in 
crease of almost 300 million in just 15 years. The total fertility rate- 
the average number of children born during a woman's lifetime—is 6.9 
in Africa, the highest in the world. 3
Looking ahead, most population experts are of the opinion that fer 
tility rates will remain high for the next 10 to 20 years because of the 
following reasons:
1. Erosion of the Custom of Abstinence. In many countries, the custom 
of abstaining from sex after a child is born ranges from 40 days 
in some Islamic groups to two years for some ethnic groups in 
Central and West Africa. When abstinence exceeds a year, it is 
usually continued until the child is weaned from the breast. This 
can lead to a spacing as much as four years between children. But 
the custom of abstinence is eroding, thus raising fertility.
2. From Breast to Bottle Feeding. The biological process of breast 
feeding suppresses ovulation up to two years for the most pro 
longed breast feeders. But the aggressive advertising of powdered 
milk and baby formula is leading to a shift from breast to bottle 
feeding, thus contributing to higher fertility rates. 
3 . Slow Adoption of Contraceptives. Knowledge about contraceptives 
is low in Africa. Two-thirds of women in Cameroon have never 
heard of them. Among the women in Kenya exposed to contracep 
tives, only 12 percent use them. Fewer than 5 percent of women 
exposed to contraceptives in Senegal—a Moslem country—use them 
(Bongaarts, Odele and Lesthaeghe 1984).
African attitudes toward rapid population growth are changing, 
however. In 1984, 40 African nations met in Kenya and adopted the 
Kilimanjaro Program of Action for Population that calls for family plan 
ning services to be made available to all couples—either free or at sub 
sidized prices. Zimbabwe has recently become the first African nation 
to achieve a statistically verified reduction in fertility levels. More than 
35 percent of urban women now use contraceptives in Zimbabwe.
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Two demographic lessons emerge from the historical experience of 
the past 25 years. First, African heads of state, donor agencies and scien 
tists have underestimated the acceleration of the annual rate of popula 
tion growth from 2.6 percent in th early 1960s to an Africa average 
of 3.2 percent today. Second, political leaders and population experts 
have underestimated the valid economic reasons why rural families want 
more children and the length of time and resources that would be re 
quired to slow population growth rates. Under conditions of surplus 
land and the lack of a state social security service, children can make 
a positive economic contribution to their families by fetching firewood, 
cutting grass for animals, as well as providing support for their parents 
in their old age.
Western science currently has no proven technology to slow Africa's 
rapid population growth. For Americans obsessed with technological 
fixes, it is difficult to realize that flooding Africa with contraceptives 
is not the answer. The high fertility and population growth rates can 
only be slowed gradually through more improvements in health, 
women's schooling, and the reduction of poverty and infant mortality.
In summary, rapid population growth will exert pressure on the natural 
resource base throughout the continent. Africa's current 3.2 percent 
rate of population growth is roughly triple the rate of growth of popula 
tion in presently industrial countries like Denmark and the Netherlands 
at a comparable stage in their economic history from 1850 to 1900, 
and in Japan from 1878 to 1912. Because of Africa's rapid rate of popula 
tion growth, policies for increasing food production and slowing popula 
tion growth must be conceptualized as long-term efforts because fer 
tility rates are simply not going to plummet over the next five to ten 
years. The agonizing lesson that flows from the historical experience 
since 1960 is that slowing the population growth rate—like increasing 
food production—is a slow, evolutionary, stepwise process.
The Human Capital Challenge
When African nations started to reclaim their independence in the 
early 1960s, illiteracy rates exceeded 90 percent in many countries and
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drop-out rates were high. Moreover, the stock of university graduates 
was exceedingly low—around 100 in Zambia—at independence and the 
enrollment ratio of students enrolled in post-high school and univer 
sities was less than 1 percent. Moreover, Sub-Saharan African coun 
tries had one-fourth the number of skilled manpower per million peo 
ple in 1970 that Asian countries had in 1960.
Looking back over the past 25 years, Africa has made enormous gains 
in education at all levels, especially up to around 1980. For example, 
the number of students enrolled in all levels—primary, secondary and 
post-secondary (includes technical schools and universities), increased 
fivefold over the 1970 to 1983 period. Despite these impressive 
achievements, however, there is growing evidence that 1980 was a turn 
ing point for education in Africa. Although total African expenditure 
on all levels of education grew from $3.8 billion in 1970 to $10.0 billion 
in 1980, total expenditure fell by 11 percent between 1980 and 1983. 
Moreover, the 8.4 percent annual rate of growth of primary schooling 
between 1970 and 1980 fell to 2.9 percent from 1980 to 1983. If the 
rate of primary school enrollment (2.9 percent) does not keep up with 
Africa's population growth of 3.2 percent, Africa's educational base 
will be eroded.
Africa's educational problems have been studied by a World Bank 
task force over the past two years. The core recommendation of the 
task force is to reduce the share of public investment on university- 
level education and to increase expenditures on primary and secondary 
education. This recommendation will be hotly criticized by leaders of 
African universities because they believe that shifting the relative mix 
of resources to primary and secondary schooling will make it difficult 
for Africa to develop its scientific capacity and reduce the number of 
expatriate teachers and researchers.
The development of higher education in Africa should be examined 
in historical perspective. When African nations became independent in 
the early 1960s, they were encouraged to import technology from in 
dustrial countries, to send Africans overseas for agricultural training 
and to rely on tens of thousands of teachers and technical advisors 
(technical assistance) to fill manpower gaps until students returned from
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overseas training. The desire for overseas training was reinforced by 
African leaders such as President Senghor of Senegal, a distinguished 
poet and leader of Senegal from independence in 1960 until he 
volunteered to retire in December 1980. Although Senghor personally 
encouraged Senegalese students to study business administration in the 
United States, one can legitimately pose the question: Why did Presi 
dent Senghor wait until 1979—19 years after independence—to start 
undergraduate training in agriculture in Senegal? This is a puzzle that 
merits closer examination because Senegal is a profoundly agrarian coun 
try with 70 percent of its people engaged in agriculture. The 19-year 
time gap cannot be blamed on French colonial policies. It is a reflec 
tion of the ambivalent attitude that Senghor and most first generation 
African leaders had for developing indigenous scientific capacity in food 
and agriculture.
After 25 years of independence, Africa is still heavily dependent on 
international advisors in most scientific and technical fields. For ex 
ample, in the early 1980s, about $4 billion or half of the annual official 
foreign aid (public) to Africa was used to pay the salaries, and "care 
and feeding" of approximately 80,000 western experts (about 40,000 
school teachers, and 40,000 expatriate advisors, managers, teachers and 
scientists). But the provision of Western (and to a lesser extent Eastern 
Bloc) technical assistance to Africa is coming under heavy attack because 
of its high cost ($100,000 to $150,000 per person per year), its rapid 
turnover, and its uneven quality. Overseas training is also under heavy 
attack because of the growing awareness among Africans that it is a 
stop gap measure for the inevitable decision that will have to be made 
to strengthen Africa's capacity to train its students at home. 
Sending foreign advisors to Africa and training Africans in the United 
States are politically popular to American taxpayers. Both activities con 
tribute to the 75 percent of all American foreign aid that is currently 
returned to the United States in the form of tuition payments, salaries 
paid to American advisors, and income derived from the sale of U.S. 
products—fertilizer, wheat, rice and tractors—for African states. But 
there is a puzzle in the human capital equation that should be critically 
examined. Why did the U.S. government take the long view in India
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in the 1960s when it helped develop 23 new state agricultural univer 
sities and fund their development for the next 15 years? Why is the 
United States taking the short-run view in Africa in the 1980s?
Unfortunately little leadership is coming from Africa on educational 
reform. African universities are notoriously overstaffed, inefficient and 
expensive. For example, in 1980-81, Nigerian universities employed 
52,000 staff (teachers, cooks, guards, servants) for a student popula 
tion of 69,000. By contrast, 8,300 employees care for 67,000 students 
in the 16 public colleges and universities in the state of West Virginia 
in 1987 (New York Times 1987). Since virtually the total cost of a univer 
sity education in Africa is paid for by the government, it is privately 
profitable for African families to send their children to universities. But 
the returns to society for university-level education are low under the 
present cost structure and priorities where students are trained in fields 
such as law, history, geography and political science instead of fields 
dominated by western advisors such as computer science, business ad 
ministration, engineering and plant science.
Africa has inherited an elitist model of higher education from the 
British, French, German and Portuguese. Because of the bleak finan 
cial position of many African countries, higher education is now under 
stress and the quality of education is falling in many universities. A 
few countries are starting to introduce long overdue structural innova 
tions, including the development of new university models that are rele 
vant to the agrarian dominated continent. For example, Tanzania recently 
started a new agricultural university—Sokoine University of 
Agriculture—that is modeled after the Punjab state agricultural univer 
sity in India, a university established in the 1960s with the assistance 
of U.S. foreign aid and technical support from Ohio State University. 
Ethiopia recently launched the Alemaya University of Agriculture at 
AJemaya.
The 25 major foreign aid donors in Africa, including the flagship 
donor—the World Bank—do not have a strategic plan on how to break 
the "iron grip" of fellowships for overseas training and providing 
technical experts to Africa. The time is ripe for a fundamental re- 
examination of human capital strategies in Africa. Most donors have 
retreated from investment in human capital. For example, Uma Lele
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of the World Bank reports that World Bank lending to education in Africa 
declined from 10.6 percent of African allocation in the 1960s, to 7.5 
percent during the 1970s, and 4.1 percent over the 1980-84 period (Lele 
1987, p. 326). In fact, in fiscal year 1984, the World Bank allocated 
only two educational loans to Africa totaling $25 million. The major 
western donors are standing on the sidelines supplying fellowships for 
overseas training and short-term technical assistance while studiously 
avoiding making the long-term commitment of funds and teachers for 
long-term human capital institution building projects that were routinely 
offered to Columbia, Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s and 1960s and 
to India and other Asian nations in the 1960s and 1970s.
In a continent with large amounts of idle land and energetic people, 
what strikes one most about Africa's underdevelopment is the dispropor 
tionate stock of skilled people between Africa and the rich countries 
and between Africa and Latin America and Asia. The challenge now 
is to assess the experience of the first 25 years of independence and 
to lay the groundwork for helping African nations develop new models 
of education that are more cost-effective, relevant and sustainable.
The Challenge of Focusing Policy Attention on the Prime Movers 
of Increasing Food and Agricultural Production
Because of favorable rainfall throughout most of Africa in 1985-87, 
the short-term food outlook for Africa is good. In fact, 12 African coun 
tries had grain surpluses in 1987. However, because of rapid popula 
tion growth, Africa faces a major agricultural production challenge. 
Food supplies will have to be doubled every 17 to 25 years to keep 
up with rapid population growth. The agricultural sector of African na 
tions will also have to generate jobs, new income streams for rural people 
and foreign exchange to enable national economies to import capital 
goods such as tractors, construction material, and mining equipment. 
However, African heads of state are being inundated with fragmented 
advice from Western donors and their advisors on how to increase and 
sustain annual food production growth rates of 3 to 5 percent over the 
next generation.
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Over the past 25 years of working on African development problems, 
I have noted that planning for increasing food and agricultural produc 
tion in Africa is heavily biased by the faddish and narrow views of the 
several dozen major donors, private voluntary agencies and legions of 
Western academic specialists who typically play up the role of a single 
factor of agricultural change such as new technology or pricing policy. 
Many of these academic specialists are zealously promoting the cur 
rent fad of donors or their discipline. For example, many plant breeders 
are understandably preoccupied with a technological fix to Africa's food 
problems and in placing more emphasis on regenerative agriculture. 
Anthropologists are rightly concerned with the cultural barriers to ex 
panded livestock offtake rates. Agricultural economists typically focus 
on one issue such as: credit, land reform or raising farm prices, while 
general economists are concerned with overvalued exchange rates and 
measures to speed market liberalization.
In a world of increasing specialization and a concern for quick fixes, 
there is an urgent need to move beyond single factors of agricultural 
development and focus on what I call the five prime movers of 
agricultural development as a policy package over the long pull. 4 These 
five prime movers of increasing food and agricultural production are:
1. New technology produced by public and private investments in 
agricultural research.
2. Human capital and managerial skills produced by investments in 
schools, training centers, and on-the-job experience.
3. Biological capital investments (e.g., improving livestock herds) 
and physical capital investment in infrastructure such as dams, ir 
rigation, and roads.
4. Improvement in the performance of institutions such as market 
ing, credit and national agricultural research and extension services.
5. Favorable economic policy environment.
A significant characteristic of the first four prime movers is their long 
gestation period (10 to 25 years). For example, experience has shown 
that it takes ten years of research, on the average, to produce a new 
plant variety, and another five to eight years to gain widespread farmer 
adoption. It takes 10 to 15 years of research on the average to develop
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new technology for increasing livestock production. It takes 10 to 15 
years of graduate study and on-the-job training for an agricultural 
research scientist to be productive. Unfortunately this time span is not 
being reflected in African development plans or in Western foreign aid 
programs that too often move from one short-term fad to another.
The second characteristic of the prime movers of agricultural develop 
ment is their complementary nature and the need to develop an integrated 
investment plan for research, extension, training, etc. The payoff to 
investment to produce new food, cash crop and livestock and technology 
will be low unless there is an effective extension service to diffuse the 
new technology. Likewise, the payoff to investing in agricultural ex 
tension services in Africa has generally been low because many national 
agricultural research services have had little to offer to extension agents. 
For example, the decision of African states to hire 50,000 additional 
extension agents over the 1959 to 1980 period was a mistake in my 
judgment because there was little proven food crop technology available 
for the extension agents to extend with a few exceptions, such as corn 
in eastern and southern Africa. For example, although the French started 
research on millet—a crop that does well in low rainfall (300 to 450 
mm)—in Senegal in 1931, there is still no breakthrough in millet research 
in Africa after five decades of research.
Let us now examine what can be done to step up food and agricultural 
production in Africa by concentrating on the five prime movers.
Technology Generation. There is growing support for the proposi 
tion that expanded rural income from multiple sources is a strategic 
variable in addressing the hunger and poverty in Africa. In short, com 
bating hunger is a more complex process than merely increasing food 
production. Hunger can be combated by expanding the production and 
sale of food crops, export crops, livestock, food and income earned 
from rural off farm employment. Agricultural research that generates 
new production technology for food crops, export crops, and livestock, 
can be important sources of income generation for farmers and a means 
for families to produce food or the income to purchase an improved diet. 
There is lack of agreement in the scientific community on the extent 
of the backlog of improved food crop varieties that are "on the shelf' 
waiting for extension agents to diffuse them to farmers. For example,
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Dunstan Spencer, an authority on African agriculture from Sierra Leone 
recently reported that probably less than 2 percent of total sorghum, 
millet and upland rice area in West Africa is sown with cultivars 
(varieties) through modern genetic research (Spencer 1986, p. 224). 
On the other hand, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), of 
the United Nations, recently asserted that in Africa "except in arid and 
semi-arid areas without irrigation, food production can be roughly doubl 
ed with existing technology. Thus, the immediate need is to provide 
adequate supplies of fertilizer, improved seeds, tools. . . ."(FAO 1986, 
p. 61).
I am of the opinion that the FAO and many other agencies have 
overstated the amount of underutilized technology that is on the shelf 
waiting for farmers to adopt. The stock of on-shelf improved, farmer- 
tested food crop technology is limited today in Africa. The few notable 
exceptions include corn in eastern and southern Africa, hybrid sorghum 
in the Sudan, potatoes in Rwanda, cassava in West Africa, and wheat 
for the cool highlands of Ethiopia, Kenya, northern Tanzania and in 
Zimbabwe where it can be grown in the cool winter months (May- 
September) under irrigation. There is a growing realization that many 
of the national research services in Africa do not have the scientific 
capacity to borrow, screen, test and adapt agricultural technology from 
neighboring countries, regional institutes, the International Agricultural 
Research Centers (lARCs) and the global research system.
The strategic importance of an efficient national agricultural research 
capacity to develop new crop and livestock technology is illustrated by 
Zimbabwe's overflowing grain silos. Currently, Zimbabwe has corn 
in storage equivalent to two years of normal domestic consumption. 
Corn contributes about 50 percent of the calories in the average diet 
in Zimbabwe and it is the staple food in diets in most eastern and southern 
Africa. Zimbabwe's corn revolution is of special interest to African 
countries because the production of corn by small farmers (smallholders) 
tripled from independence in 1980 to 1986. The highlights of Zim 
babwe's corn revolution are as follows:
• Zimbabwe's corn revolution has its origins in research on hybrid 
varieties that was launched in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern
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Rhodesia) in the 1930s. Zimbabwe became the first country after 
the U.S. to introduce hybrid corn in 1950 after carrying out local 
research from 1932 to 1950. Subsequent research in the 1950s 
led to the development of a high yielding hybrid variety (SR-52) 
that was released in 1960 to commercial (large scale) farmers. The 
28 years of local research (1932 to 1960) to develop the famous 
SR-52 hybrid corn variety (the Green Revolution crop of Southern 
Africa) makes a mockery of the three to five year agricultural 
research projects that are being currently peddled by foreign donors 
(Eicher 1984).
• Research from 1960 to 1975 developed shorter season varieties 
for small farmers in low rainfall areas. At independence in 1980, 
Zimbabwe had a backlog of corn varieties ready for delivery to 
small farmers. Today, 100 percent of the commercial farmers and 
roughly 85 percent of the small farmers use hybrid corn varieties, 
the highest of any African country (Rohrbach 1987).
• Public investments in roads, credit, extension and supporting ser 
vices facilitated the expansion of hybrid maize production by 
smallholders from 1980 to 1986.
• Corn prices to farmers were raised from 1980 to 1986 but the 
inflation-adjusted prices have fallen since 1984. Hence, maize pric 
ing policy by itself does not shed much light on Zimbabwe's maize 
revolution.
The message that emerges from Zimbabwe's corn revolution is that 
no single prime mover such as favorable corn prices was responsible 
for tripling of production by smallholders over the past six years. Zim 
babwe concentrated on the five prime movers as a policy package over 
a period of decades and developed the preconditions for the "takeoff' 
in maize production starting at independence in 1980. This is the cen 
tral finding that emerges from Zimbabwe's corn revolution—a message 
that is important for other African states, the U.S. Congress and foreign 
aid donors.
Human Capital and Managerial Skills. I have already commented 
on the great uncertainty on how to strengthen human capital in Africa. 
A major challenge facing educators and professional agriculturalists in
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African and donor agencies is figuring out how foreign assistance can 
most effectively assist in strengthening Africa's indigenous scientific, 
technical and managerial capacity in food and agriculture. Starting with 
great confidence in the 1960s, the major donors and the U.S. founda 
tions have retreated from investment in human capital in the 1970s and 
1980s. For example, the World Bank only extended two educational 
loans to Africa in 1984.
Rural Capital Formation. Agricultural development in industrial coun 
tries has been fueled by the mobilization of family labor for clearing 
land, picking stones and building fences, an accretionary type of capital 
formation whereby family labor improves land productivity and the pro 
ductivity of livestock herds over generations. Security of tenure plays 
a strategic role in converting family labor into capital formation because, 
with security, farmers can be assured that farm improvements can be 
passed on to the next generation. Unfortunately, in Africa there is a 
tendency for donors and private voluntary agencies to dole out subsidized 
credit instead of pressuring African governments to raise interest rates 
in post office savings banks, rural credit banks, etc., in order that farmers 
will have some incentive to save and finance their own farm im 
provements. There is a need for African planning to develop policies 
and institutions for African farm families to finance their own farm in 
vestments as the primary source of rural capital formation.
Rural Institutions. The fourth prime mover is strengthening the per 
formance of rural institutions ranging from farmer irrigation associa 
tions to fertilizer, credit and seed companies. But there is a paucity of 
proven strategies on how to strengthen rural institutions such as 
national agricultural research, credit and extension services. Gunnar 
Myrdal, the Nobel Laureate in Economics from Sweden, recently 
observed that unfortunately most "ordinary" economists assume away 
institutions in their studies of Third World development (Myrdal 1984).
Favorable Economic Policy Environment. The fifth prime mover— 
favorable economic policy environment—is crucially important in 
facilitating the implementation of the first four prime movers. Currently 
in Africa, the major donors—led by the IMF and the World Bank—are 
pressing African states for policy reforms in exchange for additional
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loans and grants. But there are few solid guidelines on the difficult art 
of restructuring institutions such as phasing out or abolishing govern 
ment grain boards, abolishing fertilizer subsidies and increasing the role 
of private traders in delivering farm inputs and in marketing farm pro 
ducts. In Zambia, President Kaunda's regime came close to being toppled 
in November of 1986 when 15 people were killed in food riots follow 
ing the government's decision to double the retail price of cornmeal— 
the staple food of the country—on the advice of the IMF and several 
influential western donors.
In summary, there is a need for African governments and donors to 
focus on the five prime movers of agricultural development as a policy 
package to strengthen the productive capacity of African agriculture 
over the long pull. Food aid can be used to buy time until investment 
in these prime movers pays off. But donors need to come to grips with 
long gestation investments by making an explicit, up-front commitment 
to financing human capital and institution building projects for 10 to 
20 years in Africa, just as they did in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Challenge of Reducing Poverty 
and Increasing Access to Food
A comparative study of the causes of hunger in the United States, 
India and Zimbabwe would reveal that hunger is not simply caused by 
the insufficiency of national food production, but poverty, unemploy 
ment, landlessness, sickness and other factors. We have questioned In 
dia's motives in sending food aid to Africa when about one-fourth (200 
million) of its population is hungry. Since each of these three countries 
has achieved national food self-sufficiency, one has to look beyond lag 
ging food production as the cause of hunger and food insecurity. Since 
poverty is a major cause of hunger in both rich and poor countries, raising 
per capita incomes is a powerful instrument for helping reduce hunger 
in the long run. But the long run may take 20 to 30 years or longer 
to raise per capita incomes sufficiently to enable people to purchase 
an adequate diet. Therefore, the central policy question is: Do govern-
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ments have an obligation to intervene in the short run to reduce hunger 
in rich and poor countries, including both food deficit and food surplus 
countries?
In the United States it took several decades of political debate before 
a consensus was reached on the need for the federal government to 
finance food stamps to enable the poor, sick, and the unemployed to 
acquire a calorie-adequate diet. Over the past 15 years under both 
Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States has in 
vested $9 to 20 billion per year in food transfer programs. But food 
stamps and other public food transfer programs require careful economic 
analysis in the Third World. This is especially the case in Africa where 
the annual per capita income of one-fourth the countries is below $4003 
and the national economies are strapped to maintain—let alone 
increase—public expenditures on health, education and other basic ser 
vices. For example, in Senegal the per capita income is lower today 
than it was at independence in 1960. In Zambia the average per capita 
income is now almost one-third lower than it was when President Kaunda 
took over from the British at independence (Economist 1987).
In 1987, one-fourth of the African countries (12) had food surpluses 
and three-fourths (33) had food deficits. The challenge in food deficit 
countries is to help increase food production especially among subsistence 
farmers. Increasing food production under conditions of rapid popula 
tion growth requires attention to the prime movers of agricultural 
development over the long pull.
In 1987, 12 African countries had achieved national food self- 
sufficiency and had grain for sale to neighboring countries. But in most 
of these countries, malnutrition is still a major problem because the poor 
lack the means (e.g., jobs, income, and credit) to produce and/or pur 
chase a calorie-adequate diet. There is growing awareness in African 
policy circles and among donors that expanded food production and 
the achievement of national food self-sufficiency will not automatical 
ly end hunger and that poverty must be addressed in a policy package 
to increase food intake among the malnourished.
Fortunately the rhetoric of national food self-sufficiency in many 
African countries is diminishing and more countries are starting to focus
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on both sides of the food security equation—food availability—and in 
creasing access to food by rural and urban households. Today there 
is growing awareness of the need for income and employment generating 
activities (e.g., cash crop production such as cotton and rural small scale 
industries) to help families acquire the means to increase their access 
to food.
The Challenge of Reordering Foreign Aid Priorities
Following the Sahelian drought in the mid-seventies, foreign aid to 
Africa was increased dramatically. For example, foreign aid to the 
Sahelian countries of West Africa increased at a 40 percent compound 
annual rate of growth over the 1971-78 period (Berg 1983, p. 45). To 
day most African countries are receiving two to three times more foreign 
aid on a per capita basis than their counterparts in Asia. Hence, one 
cannot make a blanket case for increasing foreign aid to Africa. In fact, 
in some African countries such as Tanzania, Sudan, Liberia, Senegal 
and Zaire, foreign aid has been a mixed blessing because of misguided 
macroeconomic policies, and low political priority to agriculture. In 
almost all African countries, aid is being delivered by a myriad of donor 
agencies in the form of short-term projects that do little to strengthen 
Africa's basic institutions such as schools, universities and national 
agricultural research services. Careful research would probably reveal 
that Africa has received too much official development assistance— 
especially since 1975—in the form of discrete short-term projects. In 
general, foreign aid has not lived up to its full potential in Africa because 
most donors shift from fad to fad (e.g., integrated rural development 
to basic needs to policy reform) and from subregion to subregion (e.g., 
Sahel to southern Africa).
Since the mid-1980s, most donors have shifted from project to policy- 
based lending under the belief that many of the tens of thousands of 
development projects across Africa (e.g., Kenya had around 1,000 
development projects in all sectors in 1985) are not performing well 
because of adverse macroeconomic policies, excessive state control and
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subsidies. But there is a basic inconsistency in IMF and World Bank 
appeals to African countries to reduce the level of subsidies in light 
of the heavy role that subsidies play in contributing to food surpluses 
in rich countries such as the United States, Japan and in Western Europe. 
Since there are many recent book length treatments of foreign aid 
(Cassen and Associates 1986) the best one can do here in the limited 
space is to point up the complexity of aid and the difficulty of generalizing 
about the efficiency of aid across 45 countries in Africa. The most im 
portant lesson that donors should learn from the postindependence foreign 
aid experience is that Africa is an agrarian continent today as it was 
at independence in 1960. Donors should put their assistance behind the 
five prime movers of agricultural development over the long pull.
Summing Up
Cutting across the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is the extraor 
dinary diversity of African people, their cultures, natural resource en 
dowments, stage of development and opportunities for development. 
The more experience one gains in Africa, the more one avoids the facile 
Pan African generalizations such as Africa is a land surplus continent. 
From the past 25 years of Africa's struggle to develop nation-states, 
to forge national identities and to improve the welfare of African peo 
ple, the following generalization flow about food and agriculture.
There is a need to grasp the immensity and diversity of the African 
continent and to seek insights into development problems and solutions 
on a subregional basis such as southern Africa, East Africa, Sahel, Cen 
tral Africa, etc. For example, because of a backlog of proven varieties 
of its staple food—corn—the food outlook in southern Africa is 
reasonably optimistic over the coming five to ten years. On the other 
hand, in semi-arid regions such as the Sahel, the food outlook is 
pessimistic because of the lack of a proven technical package for the 
two staple foods consumed by rural people—sorghum and millet—and 
the lack of proven technology for the two urban crops, rice and wheat.
Rapid population growth will not slow down in the medium term of 
six to ten years. Flooding Africa with contraceptives will not bring about
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a quick reduction in fertility rates. Rapid population growth of 3 to 4 
percent per year requires food supplies to grow at 3 to 5 percent per 
year—an extraordinary difficult task judging from historical experience. 
Despite favorable weather in most of Africa in 1985 and 1986, 
Africa faces an enormous food production challenge until population 
growth rates slow down over the next 10 to 20 years.
There is a need for stepping up investment in scientific training in 
Africa, in reducing the number of fellowships for overseas training, 
and for strengthening Africa's research and teaching institutions over 
a tune span of the next three to four decades.
Expanding food production in and of itself cannot end hunger in Africa. 
Since hunger exists in food surplus nations such as India and the United 
States, it follows that vigorous income and employment generation pro 
grams are critical in helping people increase their access to food. Present 
ly there is little debate on food access in Africa because of the legacy 
of the drought, the preoccupation of Ministries of Agriculture in in 
creasing production and the prevailing view that a food production short 
fall rather than poverty is the main cause of hunger. A vigorous educa 
tional program should be launched to move policy debate beyond food 
self-sufficiency to include both sides of the food security equation- 
food availability through domestic production, storage and trade and 
access to food through home production, employment, purchase in the 
market and food transfers such as food aid.
NOTES
1. Africa will be used in the balance of this chapter to mean Sub-Saharan Africa.
2. A technical package contains two or more components (e.g., new seed, fertilizer) that a 
farmer/herder can adopt to increase crop or livestock production.
3. The total fertility rate in many industrial countries is 1.8 to 2.2.
4. See Eicher (1985) for an expanded discussion of the five prime movers.
5. The World Bank defines a poor country as one with an average per capita income of less than 
$400.
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